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chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The provision and conservation of collective goods is challenging. In sev-
eral instances, individuals’ objectives conflict with their common interests.
Already in 1965, Mancur Olson stated that “unless the number of individ-
uals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other
special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational,
self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group
interests” (Olson, 1965, p.2). In consequence, a social dilemma may arise.
One of the major challenges to behavioral and experimental economists is
to determine the circumstances under which self-interest leads to inefficient
collective outcomes, and which are the mechanisms and institutions that
help to overcome these inefficiencies.
Collective goods are multifaceted. First, they differ in their manifesta-
tion. From playgrounds and parks in the neighborhood over public safety
to a clean environment and stable climate – collective goods take several
forms. Their manifestation determines the channel through which ineffi-
ciencies arise. Either, individuals contribute inefficiently low amounts to
the provision of the collective good, or consume inefficiently high amounts
of the collective good. The provision and conservation of collective goods
can exhibit costs for the individual that differ strongly with context, and
also between individuals. To investigate why the provision and conservation
of certain collective goods fails and how it can be achieved, research needs
to take into account these and other facets.
In recent decades, behavioral and experimental economics have impor-
tantly contributed to our understanding of the inefficiencies that arise in
the context of collective goods provision and conservation. However, polit-
ical and cultural changes as well as technological advancements constantly
lead to the emergence of new social dilemmas. These cannot always be
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properly addressed by existing economic theory of human behavior. One
such challenge to existing theory is the rise of information and knowledge as
the key drivers of economic growth (OECD, 2013). Economic experiments
can importantly contribute to our understanding of structural differences in
decision-making in the digitized economy, thereby guiding the development
of behavioral economics theory.
This thesis focuses on novel challenges and chances with regard to collec-
tive goods provision and conservation in the digitized economy. Information
has a key role in a broad range of newly emerging social dilemmas. The
advances in data collection and data mining have given rise to collective
goods that rely on the voluntary provision of personal information. Instead
of charging user fees, providers of information-based services collect cus-
tomers’ personal data in exchange for the usage of services. The collected
data, in turn, increases the quality of services to the benefit of all cus-
tomers. However, the recent privacy and data protection debate indicates
that information-based collective goods may be severely distorted due to
implicit costs of provision. In consequence, we are confronted with a social
dilemma which is structurally different from existing paradigms.
The rise of knowledge as a key driver of economic growth also confronts
us with novel challenges. In contrast to collective goods problems consid-
ered by the standard literature, knowledge creation is characterized by an
important difference. Contributions are frequently not verifiable ex post.
In consequence, the surplus from cooperation may be subject to subsequent
competition. Given that economic growth increasingly relies on “knowledge
capital” (OECD, 2013), it is crucial to determine the circumstances under
which the provision of knowledge-based collective goods may be distorted.
There is ongoing exchange of information in the digitized economy. This
provides us with a broad range of opportunities to counteract ill-informed
decision-making. In recent years, research provided evidence that behavior
is biased towards salient individual costs and benefits, often at the disre-
gard of long-term costs for the collective. In the context of collective goods
conservation, modern technologies can help to overcome this salience bias.
Feedback provision, e.g., by the use of smart meters and web applications,
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can induce more sustainable decision-making. However, only little is known
how individual costs of resource conservation interact with feedback provi-
sion.
OVERVIEW AND MAIN FINDINGS
Chapter 2 (Providing personal information to the benefit of others) is joint
work with Bettina Rockenbach and Abdolkarim Sadrieh. We examine the
willingness to provide real personal information to information-based public
goods. In a laboratory experiment, we retrieve subjects’ personal informa-
tion and systematically vary the implicit cost of information provision. We
find that in comparison to the provision of money, personal information
may be under-provided when it exhibits a high implicit provision cost.
Chapter 3 (Paying with your information: The efficiency-enhancing
effects of data provision) is joint work with Bettina Rockenbach and Ab-
dolkarim Sadrieh. We examine whether the large gains of the provider of
an information-based public good may crowd-out the willingness to provide
real personal information. In contrast to the former study, personal infor-
mation is not particularly implicitly costly. We introduce a “big player” who
cannot contribute to the information-based public good, but profits greatly
from the provided information. We find that the provision of information is
less susceptible to the gains of the “big player” than the provision of money.
This benefits both the big player and the collective of contributors.
Taken together, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 demonstrate that the pro-
vision of personal information to information-based public goods exhibits
important structural differences to the provision of money. From a method-
ological perspective, two findings are especially important. First, implicit
costs determine which types of information are provided. Second, absent
these costs, decision-making importantly deviates from the predictions of
outcome-based models of fairness. Given the amplified importance of per-
sonal information in the digitized economy, we conclude that research needs
to account for these and other structural differences between material and
information-based public goods. From a policy perspective, the results
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of the first study demonstrate that the effectiveness of information-based
public goods may be seriously limited. The implication is that providers of
information-based public goods need to take into account structural distor-
tions which can arise from implicit costs of information provision. In some
instances, it may be more beneficial to charge user fees or collect taxes to
provide a certain public good. On the other hand, the second study shows
that absent high implicit provision costs, the collection of personal infor-
mation may be more beneficial than the charging of user fees or the levy
of taxes. This demonstrates that policy makers are well-advised to take
individuals’ concerns for privacy and data protection seriously and develop
mechanisms that effectively protect individuals from data misuse. Only
then, we can secure the potentials of information-based public goods.
Chapter 4 (Cooperation and the prospect of competing over jointly cre-
ated surplus) examines the provision of collective goods when individual
contributions are ex post unverifiable and the surplus from cooperation is
subject to subsequent competition.1 In this situation, steep incentives may
impede the willingness to provide the collective good in the first place. In
a laboratory experiment, I study the willingness to cooperate in anticipa-
tion of competing in a winner-take-all contest. I find that in comparison to
a proportional-share contest which leads to more equitable outcomes, the
winner-take-all contest seriously impedes cooperation. The results of this
study suggest that the anticipation of winner-take-all competition leads to
an unwillingness to cooperate in the first place, and the experience of not
being able to recoup investments into cooperation may erode the willingness
to cooperate even further.
From a methodological point of view, the results of Chapter 4 demon-
strate that the interaction between surplus generation and surplus sharing
exhibits important structural differences to the standard paradigm of collec-
tive goods provision. Given that in certain competitive environments (e.g.,
in contests) individual decision-making systematically deviates from the
theoretical prediction, inefficient outcomes may arise more frequently un-
1Financial support by the Research Unit Design and Behavior is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
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der certain rules for the allocation of surplus. Given the amplified relevance
of knowledge-based collective goods, research has a key role in developing
mechanisms that help to overcome these inefficiencies. From a policy per-
spective, the findings of Chapter 4 demonstrate that there may be an eco-
nomic cost to steep incentives that reaches far beyond concerns for unequal
opportunities and growing inequality. Steep incentives may importantly
deteriorate social cohesion as both the anticipation and the experience of
falling short can erode the willingness to act prosocially. Policy makers are
well-advised to reconsider the pervasiveness of steep incentives in the orga-
nizational structure of firms, the industry, job markets and the educational
system.
Chapter 5 (Crowding-in sustainable consumption under varying oppor-
tunity costs) is joint work with Thomas Lauer and Christopher Zeppenfeld.2
We examine how feedback on resource consumption affects decision-making
under varying opportunity costs of resource conservation. In a laboratory
experiment, subjects face a tedious real-effort task that can be simplified
by the use of a shortcut. However, the use of the shortcut leads to a real
waste of resources. Each time a shortcut is used, a blank sheet of paper is
shredded. In one condition, we provide feedback on accumulated resource
wasting and constantly confront subjects with a stream of their total pa-
per waste. In the other condition, the paper waste is hidden within the
shredding bin. We vary the time restriction to induce different opportunity
costs of resource conservation. Our results demonstrate that the effect of
feedback indeed differs with the opportunity costs of resource conservation.
Feedback on accumulated resource wasting does not have an impact on
resource consumption when opportunity costs are low. However, when op-
portunity costs are high, feedback on accumulated resource-wasting reduces
resource consumption.
From a methodological point of view, Chapter 5 demonstrates that the
efficacy of feedback interventions is highly context-dependent. Thus, the
interplay between feedback and individual opportunity costs should be a
2Financial support by the C-SEB Junior Start-Up Grant and the Cologne Graduate
School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences is gratefully acknowledged.
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cornerstone of any intervention design. From a policy perspective, the re-
sults of our study demonstrate that modern technologies indeed have the
potential to induce the conservation of collective goods. However, feed-
back interventions need to carefully take into account that in the field, high
individual costs of conservation may be externalized.
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chapter 2
PROVIDING PERSONAL INFORMATION TO THE
BENEFIT OF OTHERS
Abstract
The provision of personal information can create public benefits,
e.g., by reporting location data to control traffic flows or by sharing
one’s health status to improve disease control. We experimentally
study the willingness to provide personal information to information-
based public goods and find that – in comparison to the provision
of material public goods – information-based public goods may be
under-provided. We present evidence that this under-provision re-
sults from implicit (emotional and cognitive) costs making subjects
reluctant to share certain personal information. Our results demon-
strate that implicit costs of information provision may seriously limit
the effectiveness of information-based public goods.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The provision of personal information frequently creates public benefits. For
example, the effectiveness of public disease control crucially depends on the
individual’s willingness to report a suspected illness to a national health
authority. The accuracy of policy measures critically depends on the indi-
vidual’s willingness to report her socio-demographic data. The exactness of
traffic information importantly depends on the individual’s willingness to
share her current location.
Without doubt, the provision of personal information creates benefits
for the public in all these examples. However, in contrast to material con-
tributions to public goods, like donating money to construct a playground
in the neighborhood, personal information exhibits an important structural
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difference: Beyond explicit transaction or opportunity costs, the provider
of personal information may incur implicit provision costs. These implicit
provision costs can include cognitive costs of information compilation, “emo-
tional” costs of expected negative effects of information leakage or fear of
ostracism, self-image concerns or disutility from cognitive dissonance. Then,
preference heterogeneity with regard to provision may even be more pro-
nounced than in material public goods games (Fischbacher and Ga¨chter,
2010). The question is whether and how the implicit costs of informa-
tion provision influence the willingness to provide information-based public
goods. Answering this question is particularly important as the advances
in data collection and data mining that enable far-reaching analyses and in-
ference have improved tremendously. However, their success crucially relies
on individuals’ willingness to provide personal information. The current
privacy debate creates great concern about the unbiasedness and complete-
ness of the collected data. Research shows that people hold idiosyncratic
preferences for privacy, and that these preferences strongly depend on the
context and also on the type of personal information (see Aquisti et al.,
2015; Acquisti et al., 2016). Although the topic’s relevance amplifies with
the rapid technological advancements, to the best of our knowledge no study
investigates the willingness to provide personal information to the public
benefit.1 However, to develop effective policy measures, we need to under-
stand the role of emotions and cognition in information provision (e.g., van
Winden, 2015).
In this paper, we experimentally study the willingness to provide per-
sonal information to information-based public goods, and compare this to
the willingness to provide money to material public goods. We set up four
treatments, varying the unit of provision (information vs. money), and the
explicit net cost of provision (cost vs. no cost). In the information treat-
ments, subjects provide real personal information about themselves (e.g.,
about their preferences, past behavior or physical characteristics). Because,
1The existing experimental literature focuses on trade-offs between individual costs
and benefits (e.g., Benndorf and Normann, forthcoming; Schudy and Utikal, 2017; Feri
et al., 2016; Beresford et al., 2012; Jentzsch et al., 2012; Tsai et al., 2011; Huberman et
al., 2005).
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as discussed above, the willingness to share personal information may de-
pend on implicit costs of information provision, we systematically vary these
costs. To gain a proxy for the implicit costs of information provision, we
conducted a survey study asking (different) participants to rate how cog-
nitively difficult and how emotionally demanding it would be for them to
answer certain questions asking for particular personal information.
Our experimental results show that information provision to the benefit
of others is treated differently than money provision. Information rated low
in implicit provision costs is provided much more frequently than informa-
tion rated high in implicit provision costs, where emotional costs seem to
loom larger than cognitive cost. As a result, when explicit net provision
costs are zero (i.e., when the individual monetary benefit from provision
equals the individual monetary costs), selective information provision even
leads to under-provision compared to the provision of money.
Our study provides evidence that already in an abstract laboratory set-
ting where we can guarantee for subjects’ privacy and data protection, im-
plicit costs lead to selective information provision, and may thus lead to
under-provision of information-based public goods (compared to material
public goods). We conclude that high implicit costs of information provi-
sion can lead to structural distortions of information-based public goods
that cannot be overcome by a reduction of the explicit net cost of informa-
tion provision.
2.2 RELATED LITERATURE
In recent years, various disciplines have contributed to the growing liter-
ature on privacy. A recent survey by Acquisti et al. (2016) illustrates
the broad scope of the issue that touches several disciplines, e.g., the le-
gal sciences, philosophy, computer sciences, and economics. Most of the
economics literature focuses on the informational dimension of privacy and
takes a regulatory perspective on the “trade-offs associated with the balanc-
ing of public and private spheres between individuals, organizations, and
governments” (Acquisti et al., 2016, p. 443). Another growing literature fo-
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cuses on the behavioral dimension of privacy. These papers assume implicit
concerns for privacy and focus on the individual’s cost-benefit-calculus. Re-
cent surveys and experimental studies provide insight into the individual
willingness to trade personal information for individual benefits. Acquisti
et al. (2016) and Acquisti et al. (2015) summarize the empirical evidence
by the following remarks: 1) The implicit cost of information provision is
context-dependent. This means that an individual may provide personal
information in one situation, but may refrain from information provision
in another situation. Further, 2) implicit costs are subjective and idiosyn-
cratic. This means that in the same situation, some individuals will pro-
vide their personal information while other individuals will not. In what
follows we focus on experimental papers providing evidence that prefer-
ences for data privacy 1) are susceptible to the framing of decisions, lead
to 2) selection effects under varying privacy conditions, 3) selective infor-
mation provision, and that 4) different privacy policies lead to differences
in decision-making.
In a recent experiment Marreiros et al. (2017) provide evidence of fram-
ing effects on privacy preferences. The authors examine respondents’ will-
ingness to provide personal information after evaluating excerpts from news-
paper articles that relate to the issue of data privacy. Treatments vary the
content of the excerpts and highlight either a positive or a negative aspect
of companies’ privacy policies. Information provision is not incentivized
and subjects are paid a flat fee for participating in the survey. Marreiros et
al. (2017) find that the likelihood of information provision decreases and
stated preferences for privacy become more conservative when respondents
are presented with negative aspects of companies’ privacy policies. In a
field experiment, Acquisti et al. (2013) examine framing effects on the sta-
bility of the value assigned to privacy protection. Subjects are given the
choice between two Visa gift cards, one of which is loaded with $12 and
programmed such that the name of the subject will be linked to the com-
pleted transactions, and one of which is loaded with $10 and states that
the name of the subject will not be linked to any completed transaction.
Treatments vary subjects’ initial endowments, and the ordering of choices.
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Acquisti et al. (2013) find that the value assigned to privacy protection
is affected both by initial endowments and the ordering of choices. In a
laboratory experiment, Grossklags and Acquisti (2007) study framing ef-
fects with regard to the willingness to sell and the willingness to protect
personal information. Subjects participate in a quiz and their body weight
is recorded. Treatments vary whether subjects are given the opportunity
to pay to protect their personal information from release to their group, or
to sell their personal information for release to their group. Grossklags and
Acquisti (2007) find that subjects’ average willingness to sell is higher than
their average willingness to protect. Further, subjects opt into selling (not
protecting, respectively) their personal information already for very small
amounts of money.
In a laboratory experiment, Huberman et al. (2005) study selection
effects with regard to the willingness to sell personal information in a reverse
second-price auction. The subject with the lowest price is paid the second-
lowest price and has to reveal information on her weight and age to the other
participants (but remains anonymous). Huberman et al. (2005) find that
the subgroup of subjects with less socially desirable traits is likely to demand
a higher price in the auction. In another experiment, Feri et al. (2016)
investigate subjects’ willingness to sell personal information about outcomes
in an IQ test that is linked to their names in order to receive a shopping
voucher at a discounted price. With a probability of 50% percent, a data
breach occurs. Then, the subject’s personal information is potentially being
revealed to the other participants. Whether the data breach actually leads
to revelation depends on another random draw: Subjects can sell their
personal information in two periods of which one is randomly selected at the
end of the experiment. If the subject sold her data in that period and a data
breach has occurred, her personal information is revealed to all participants.
Treatments vary the feedback subjects receive at the end of the first period.
In one treatment, subjects are informed about the occurrence of a data
breach. In another treatment, no feedback is provided. Feri et al. (2016)
find that feedback induces the subgroup of subjects with below-median test
results to sell less personal information.
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Benndorf and Normann (forthcoming) experimentally study selective in-
formation provision. Treatments vary the elicitation method: In one treat-
ment, the willingness to accept is elicited using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
mechanism (Becker et al., 1964). In another treatment, the willingness to
accept is elicited using a take-it-or-leave-it-offer. In both treatments, sub-
jects are asked to sell different bundles of personal information to a German
telecommunications company which uses the retrieved information for mar-
ket research. Benndorf and Normann (forthcoming) retrieve different infor-
mation sets and vary the anonymity of the respondent (e.g., subjects are
asked to provide a digital copy of their Facebook account). The authors find
evidence of considerable heterogeneity in subjects’ preferences for privacy
that depend on the type of information. Further, the likelihood of informa-
tion provision is higher if the subject remains anonymous. In another paper,
Schudy and Utikal (2017) study the willingness to sell personal information
with varying recipients. In one experimental treatment, recipients are living
in the same city. In another experimental treatment, recipients are peers
from a different city. The authors also use the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
mechanism to elicit the willingness to sell personal information. Further,
the type of information is varied. The authors find that the likelihood of in-
formation provision is higher if information is not potentially embarrassing,
and if the recipient is not a proximate peer.
Three studies provide evidence that decision-making differs under vary-
ing privacy policies. In a laboratory experiment, Tsai et al. (2011) examine
subjects’ willingness to purchase from retailers with varying privacy indi-
cators. Subjects are asked to use a search engine and make real purchases
of a specific good. Treatments vary the availability of privacy indicators
and the price of the good. Tsai et al. (2011) find that the likelihood of
a purchase is higher if the retailer engages in privacy protection. Further,
subjects are willing to pay higher prices to purchase from these retailers. In
another experiment, Jentzsch et al. (2012) find contrasting evidence. The
authors study subjects’ willingness to purchase cinema tickets from retail-
ers with varying privacy policies and prices. The main findings are that
the majority of subjects purchases from the retailer with the lower price.
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However, in line with the findings by Tsai et al. (2011), Jentzsch et al.
(2012) also observe that a non-negligible fraction of subjects is willing to
purchase from the retailer with the higher price if this retailer requests less
personal information, or promises not to use it for marketing purposes. In
a field experiment, Beresford et al. (2012) find similar results. The authors
also examine subjects’ willingness to purchase from two competing online
retailers with different privacy policies. One of the two retailers requires the
provision of more sensitive personal information than the other. Treatments
vary the price of the retailer requesting more sensitive personal information.
Interestingly, Beresford et al. (2012) find no evidence of implicit costs of
information provision. Subjects purchase from the retailer with the lower
price. If prices are equal, then there is no difference in the likelihood to
purchase from one retailer or the other.
2.3 VOLUNTARY INFORMATION PROVISION
2.3.1 THE MODEL
We set up a public goods game in which payoffs increase in the other players’
provision. The game consists of n ≥ 2 players indexed by i = 1, ..., n. Player
i’s utility function in the game with money provision is given by:
Ui(gi, gj) = e− cgi + α
∑
j 6=i
gj. (2.3.1)
Each player i is endowed with e monetary units. Players simultaneously
decide how many units gi ∈ {0, ..., e} to provide to the public good. For
each unit player i provides, she incurs an explicit monetary net provision
cost of c ≥ 0. Each unit provided by the n−1 other players increases player
i’s utility by 0 < α < 1.2
2Note that in contrast to the standard objective function in most public goods set-
tings, parameter α constitutes a constrained marginal per capita return in our model
since only the n − 1 other players of the group benefit from player i’s provision. The
objective function is equal to the standard objective function if the net cost of provision
is set to c = 1− α.
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There is an important structural difference between the provision of
money and the provision of information. While the units of provision are
not distinguishable in the game with money provision, the units of provision
may exhibit different implicit provision costs in the game with information
provision (see discussion in Section 2.2). That is, in addition to the explicit
net cost of provision, player i may incur an implicit cost of provision if she
provides personal information. Further, this implicit cost may differ for
different types of information. We account for this by adding an additional
cost term to the player’s utility function and allowing that the of units of
provision are distinguishable.
In the game with information provision, each player i is endowed with a
set of items of private information Θi = {θi1, θi2, ..., θim}. We assume that
the number of items m contained in a player’s information set Θi is identical
for all n players. Each player i receives base utility vik from item θik,3 i.e.,
her endowment is worth ∑mk=1 vik units of utility. Let xik ∈ {0, 1} be player
i’s choice variable that indicates whether player i provides the kth item of
her information set Θi, with
xik =
0 if player i does not provide θik1 if player i provides θik.
Player i’s decision is given by the choice vector xi = (xi1, xi2, ..., xim).
Player i’s utility function in the game with information provision is given
by:
Ui(xik, xjk) =
m∑
k=1
(vik − (c+ γik)xik) + α
∑
j 6=i
m∑
k=1
xjk. (2.3.2)
The utility function, for most of its parts, corresponds to the standard
objective function in public goods settings. The main structural difference is
that we integrate an additional cost variable γik which captures the implicit
provision cost that may vary between players as well as between items.
The implicit cost may include cognitive costs of information compilation,
3For example, knowing the own preferences, past behavior or physical characteristics
is valuable in the individual’s current and future decision-making.
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“emotional” costs of expected negative effects of information leakage, fear
of ostracism, self-image concerns or disutility from cognitive dissonance. In
general, we expect the implicit provision costs to be linked to the cognitive
and emotional load of the requested information.
In the game with information provision, players simultaneously decide
for each item θik of their information set Θi whether to provide the item or
not. We assume that the provision of an item does not reveal the personal
information to any other player. As in the game with money provision,
player i incurs an explicit (monetary) net provision cost of c ≥ 0 that is
equal for all items. Each item provided by the n− 1 other players increases
player i’s utility by 0 < α < 1.
All differences between Equation 2.3.1 and Equation 2.3.2 stem from two
structural differences between money and information: First, in the case of
information the units of provision are distinguishable, while this does not
hold for money. This is captured by the indicator choice variable xik and the
individual value of information vik in Equation 2.3.2. Second, we integrate
an additional cost term, the implicit provision cost γik, in Equation 2.3.2.
All other model parameters, especially the net cost from the own provision
c and the return α from another player’s provision do not differ between
the two models.
2.3.2 HYPOTHESES
A rational player i maximizes her utility with respect to the items she pro-
vides. Obviously, as long as there is a positive net cost to the provision
of information (no matter whether explicit or implicit) the dominant strat-
egy is not to provide information. Hence, in the only utility maximizing
equilibrium with positive costs, player i provides no information. If both
the explicit net provision costs and the implicit provision costs are equal to
zero (c = 0 and γik = 0), the player is indifferent between providing and
not providing information. Without costs, any mixture of provision and
non-provision may be in equilibrium. The own payoff-maximizing equilib-
ria in the game with monetary contributions have similar characteristics. In
15
the equilibrium with explicit net costs of provision, players do not provide
money to the public good, while with zero explicit net costs, any level of
provision is possible. If we assume that players are concerned about others’
material payoffs, it is likely that the pareto-efficient equilibrium is selected,
leading to higher provision levels absent explicit net provision costs.
Hypothesis 1. Both in the info and money condition, with positive ex-
plicit net provision costs the provision level is lower than with zero explicit
net provision costs.
Our second hypothesis concerns the difference between information and
money provision. Conceivably, the provision of information involves higher
costs than the provision of money since any implicit costs of information
provision top off the explicit net costs. Hence, ceteris paribus we expect
higher provision levels of money than information, assuming that the im-
plicit costs are not zero for all items.
Hypothesis 2. The provision level in the money condition is higher
than in the information condition.
In the case in which players hold social preferences the predictions of
Hypothesis 1 remain unchanged. This is true because the explicit net costs
of provision generally drive the cost-benefit calculus of players towards less
provision, no matter whether or not they have an additional other-regarding
utility.4 However, if a player maximizes joint utility of the group, even items
with a positive implicit provision cost may be provided. From the utility
function in Equation 2.3.2, we see that in the social optimum of the game
player i provides all items with certainty which exhibit zero implicit pro-
vision costs (which is in contrast to the set of Nash equilibria under c = 0
where player i is just indifferent with regard to provision). Further, to
4In a symmetric game with inequity-averse players, the prediction is even more ex-
treme, because any provision – with or without explicit net costs – leads to a deterioration
of the own payoff position compared to that of the other players.
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maximize joint utility, she also provides items with a low implicit provision
cost.5 This means that if a player maximizes joint utility and incurs only
low implicit costs of information provision, she provides more information
than a player who incurs high implicit costs.
Hypothesis 3. The likelihood of provision is higher for information
with low implicit costs than for information with high implicit costs.
2.4 THE EXPERIMENT
We experimentally study the willingness to provide personal information
to information-based public goods, and compare this to the willingness to
provide money to material public goods. In this section, we present the ex-
perimental design, explain how we measure the implicit costs of information
provision, and provide information on the experimental procedure.
2.4.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We examine the voluntary provision of personal information to the benefit
of others, and compare it to the voluntary provision of money. To examine
whether there are structural differences between the provision of money
and information, we set up four treatments in a 2×2-design where we vary
the unit of provision (information vs. money) and the explicit monetary
net provision costs (cost vs. no cost). The experimental treatments are
summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Treatments.
information money
cost INFO MONEY
no cost INFO NC MONEY NC
5Precisely, all items with γik < −c+ α(n− 1) are provided in the social optimum of
the game.
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All treatments are one-shot paper-and-pencil experiments with a group
size of four players. In the money treatments, subjects are endowed with 20
monetary units and decide how many units to contribute to the public good.
In the information treatments, subjects receive 20 questions and decide
which of them to answer. Answering a question (“providing an item”) means
providing to the information-based public good. Each item and each unit is
worth e0.30, i.e., the total endowment of a subject equals e6.00=20×e0.30.
In Table 2.2, the marginal payoffs from the own provision and from the
provision of the other group members are given for the cost and the no cost
condition (marginal payoffs are identical for the information and the money
condition). The decision to keep an item (i.e., not provide the information)
or a monetary unit gives the player e0.30 while each of the other players
receives zero, both in the cost and the no cost condition. The decision
to provide an item (i.e., provide the information) or a unit gives e0.12 to
the provider and each of the other players in the cost condition, and hence
incurs a monetary net provision cost of e0.18. In the no cost condition,
the decision to provide an item or a unit does not change the payoff of
the provider, but gives e0.12 to each of the other players. Hence, the
monetary net provision cost is zero in the no cost condition. By comparing
provision levels under the different net monetary costs of provision, we can
investigate whether information provision can be incentivized in the same
way as money provision.
Table 2.2: Marginal payoffs.
cost condition no cost condition
self others self others
item/unit kept e0.30 e0.00 e0.30 e0.00
item/unit provided e0.12 e0.12 e0.30 e0.12
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2.4.2 IMPLICIT PROVISION COSTS
As the provision of information may incur implicit provision costs (in ad-
dition to the explicit costs), we assessed the implicit costs of the 20 items
(questions) in a survey study in a large undergraduate economics class. In
Table 2.3, the 20 items and corresponding questions are given.
Table 2.3: Items in the information treatments.
No. Item Question
Cognitive load Emotional load Comb.
mean median mean median measure
1 gender Are you male or female? 1.0948 1 1.4976 1 0.5066
2 eye
color
What is your eye color? 1.4787 1 1.5024 1 0.6939
3 age What is your age? 1.1848 1 1.7062 1 0.7300
4 subject
of
study
Are you currently enrolled and if so,
what is your subject of study?
1.1517 1 1.8057 1 0.8198
5 shoe
size
What is your shoe size? 1.4739 1 1.8246 1 0.9511
6 study
dura-
tion
If you are studying, how long have you
been studying so far?
1.3365 1 1.9336 2 0.9924
7 height What is your height? 1.4455 1 1.9526 2 1.0516
8 zip
code
What is your zip code? 1.6825 1 1.9621 1 1.1796
9 clothes How often do you return clothing to
the seller as unused after having actu-
ally used it?
1.8057 1 1.9573 2 1.2513
10 credit How often do you overdraw your bank
account?
1.5071 1 2.1659 1 1.2714
11 season What is your favorite season? 2.1754 2 1.6635 1 1.3497
12 size What is the size of your clothing? 2.1706 2 2.2038 2 1.6791
13 cheating How often have you cheated in exams? 2.1185 2 2.3223 2 1.7319
14 travel Where would you like to travel? 2.7488 2 1.5924 1 1.8464
15 sex How often do you have sex per week? 1.8057 1 2.7867 3 1.9600
16 weight What is your weight? 2.1043 2 2.7014 3 2.0284
17 lying How often do you lie to your best
friend?
2.3744 2 2.5308 2 2.0573
18 drink What is your favorite drink? 2.8294 3 1.9668 2 2.0692
19 actor Who is your favorite actor? 4.0616 4 2.3602 2 3.3502
20 song What is currently your favorite song? 4.4692 5 2.1801 2 3.6644
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A total of 211 respondents separately evaluated each of the 20 items,
concerning the cognitive load (“When answering this question I have to
think...”) and the emotional load (“When answering this question I feel...”).6
Answers to the cognitive load question are on a 6-point Likert scale from (“I
have to think”) “very little” to “very hard”. Answers to the emotional load
question are on a 6-point Likert scale from (“I feel”) “very uncomfortable”
to “very comfortable”.7 Table 2.3 presents the mean and median item eval-
uation, where “very little” and “very comfortable” were coded with a value
of 1, while “very hard” and “very uncomfortable” were coded with a value
of 6. In the table, items are sorted on the basis of a combined measure of
both evaluations.8
2.4.3 PROCEDURE
During 2013, we conducted two sessions of each of the four treatments in the
Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER), University of Cologne,
Germany. We recruited our participants using the Online Recruitment Sys-
tem for Economic Experiments (Greiner, 2015). Overall, 212 participants
participated with 55% female and 45% male, and mostly participants were
students from economics, social sciences, and business administration. Be-
fore the experiment, a random draw determined the order in which items
were put into each participant’s envelope in the information condition.
Each experimental session was one-shot paper-and-pencil and lasted
around one hour. The written instructions in the information treatments in-
formed the participant that the experiment involves a decision to either keep
information for herself, or to truthfully answer the question and thereby
6Translated questionnaires can be found in the Appendix.
7We find no order effects in the evaluation of items. Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient between the order of presentation and the mean and median item assessment
is insignificant both for the cognitive and emotional load (p-values range from p=0.5908
to p=0.8750).
8We combine both evaluations by building the Euclidean distance from the most
positive evaluation on both dimensions, i.e., from the origin of (1, 1). The Euclidean
distance is calculated for each item separately by the following formula:
d(x, y) =
√
(meancognitive load − 1)2 + (meanemotional load − 1)2.
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provide it to the group account.9 In the money treatments, the written
instructions stated that the experiment involves a decision to either keep
money or to provide it to the group account. In all treatments, participants
received 20 sheets of paper in an envelope. In the information treatments,
the term “information” and one of the 20 questions given in Table 2.3 were
printed on each sheet of paper. To provide an item to the group account,
the participant was asked to write the answer to the question on the respec-
tive sheet of paper.10 We ensured that answers to the questions could not
be ascribed to a participant’s identity. This was also stated clearly in the
instructions. In the money treatments, the term “money” and a text input
field were printed on each sheet of paper. To provide a unit to the group
account, the participant was asked to write the word “group” on the respec-
tive sheet of paper.11 The instructions stated clearly that no participant
would receive feedback about individual provision levels.
After participants made their provision decisions, they were asked to
put all sheets back into the envelope and hand it over to the experimenter.
While the experimenter calculated the payoffs in a separate room, partici-
pants answered a short questionnaire. In this questionnaire, we also asked
for participants’ beliefs regarding their group members’ decisions. Belief
elicitation was not incentivized. After the experiment, participants were
paid anonymously in a separate room. On average, participants earned
e10.20 in INFO (min: e5.20; max: e15.10), e14.90 in INFO NC (min:
e12.90; max: 15.70), e10.00 in MONEY (min: e6.10; max: e13.70), and
e15.50 in MONEY NC (min: e13.30; max: e15.70) including the show-up
fee of e2.50.
We collected between 52 and 56 independent observations for each of
the four treatments. By conducting one-shot experiments, we ensured sta-
tistical independence of all observations. If not stated otherwise, statistical
comparisons between treatments are based on two-sided Mann-Whitney U-
9Translated instructions are provided in the Appendix.
10We emphasized that the answers should be truthful.
11Pictures of the experimental setup can be found in the Appendix.
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tests (MWU), and comparisons within treatments are based on two-sided
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (WSR).
2.5 RESULTS
We present our experimental results in two steps. In part one, we analyze
treatment differences with regard to average provision levels (see Section
2.5.1). We find that (1) with positive explicit net provision costs the provi-
sion level is lower than with zero explicit net provision costs, and (2) that
the provision level in the money treatment is higher than in the information
treatment if explicit net provision costs are zero. In part two, we analyze
the likelihood of item provision in the information treatments (see Section
2.5.2). We find that (3) subjects engage in selective information provision,
i.e., items with a low implicit provision cost are more likely provided than
items with a high implicit provision cost.
2.5.1 INFORMATION AND MONEY PROVISION
In this section, we analyze the effect of explicit net provision costs on the
provision of information and money. We further study differences between
information and money provision. In line with Hypothesis 1, we expect
higher average provision levels in the no cost condition than in the cost
condition. Further, in line with Hypothesis 2, we expect higher average
provision levels in the money than in the information treatments.
Table 2.4: Average provision levels.
INFO INFO NC MONEY MONEY NC
Avg. provision level 9.23 (1.11) 17.80 (0.61) 8.12 (1.01) 19.29 (0.47)
% of endowment 46.15 89.02 40.58 96.44
Ind. obs. 52 56 52 52
Notes: The table reports average provision levels and standard errors (in parentheses) by
treatment.
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As shown in the first row of Table 2.4, subjects’ average provision lev-
els are close to 50% if provision is costly to them. On average, subjects
provide 9.23 items in INFO, and 8.12 units in MONEY. If the provision
exhibits zero net costs, average provision levels are higher, and subjects
provide 17.80 items in INFO NC and 19.29 units in MONEY NC. With
regard to the effect of explicit net provision costs on the provision of money
and information, we find that average provision levels are significantly lower
in presence of explicit net provision costs both in the info and the money
condition (p=0.0000, for both comparisons). This finding is in line with
Hypothesis 1.
Result 1. Both in the info and the money condition, with positive ex-
plicit net provision costs the provision level is significantly lower than with
zero explicit net provision costs.
With regard to differences between the provision of information and
money, we find mixed results. Hypothesis 2 needs to be rejected for the
cost condition where we find no statistically significant differences between
average provision levels (INFO vs. MONEY: p=0.5144). However, we can-
not reject Hypothesis 2 for the no cost condition in which subjects provide
significantly more money than information (INFO NC vs. MONEY NC:
p=0.0010).
Result 2. With positive explicit net provision costs, there is no sta-
tistically significant difference in the provision of information and money.
With zero explicit net provision costs, provision levels are higher in the
money condition than in the info condition.
2.5.2 SELECTIVE INFORMATION PROVISION
In this section, we investigate the impact of implicit provision costs on the
likelihood of information provision. There is a significant negative correla-
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tion between the item’s combined measure of implicit provision costs and
the respective average provision level in both treatments (Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient, INFO: p=0.0013; INFO NC: p=0.0061). To test how
the implicit provision cost affects the likelihood of information provision,
we run a probit regression where the likelihood of item contribution is the
dependent variable.
Table 2.5: Likelihood of item contribution.
(1) (2) (3)
expl. cost -1.3388*** -1.3624*** -1.6501***
(0 = no cost, 1 = cost) (0.22) (0.22) (0.54)
combined measure cognitive and emotional load -0.1825***
(Euclidean distance from origin) (0.04)
mean cognitive load -0.0239 0.0066
(1 = very low, 6 = very high) (0.03) (0.05)
mean emotional load -0.6175*** -0.7311***
(1 = very low, 6 = very high) (0.10) (0.17)
expl. cost × mean cognitive load -0.0520
(0.06)
expl. cost × mean emotional load 0.1905
(0.20)
constant 1.5255*** 2.5660*** 2.7419***
(0.18) (0.29) (0.47)
number of observations 2,160 2,160 2,160
number of subjects 108 108 108
Pseudo-R-squared 0.1885 0.2010 0.2014
Notes: Probit regression clustered by subject, robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable:
Contribution of item (0 = no, 1 = yes). *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.
Table 2.5 reports the results from the probit regression. In model (1),
the first coefficient replicates the above finding that explicit monetary net
provision costs have a significant negative effect on the likelihood of item
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provision. The second coefficient shows that the higher an item scores on
the combined cognitive and emotional dimension, the less likely it is to be
provided. In model (2), we disentangle the effect of cognitive and emo-
tional load. We find that while both coefficients are negative, only the
mean emotional load has a significant negative effect on the likelihood of
item provision.12 In model (3), we interact the explicit monetary provision
costs with the mean cognitive and emotional load. Both interactions are
insignificant, meaning that the impact of the implicit provision costs on the
likelihood of item provision does not differ across the cost conditions. The
significant negative effect of the emotional load and the combined measure
yields support for Hypothesis 3.
Result 3. The higher the item’s implicit provision cost, the lower is the
likelihood of the item’s provision.
To further investigate our finding that selective information provision
caused by implicit costs of information provision may explain the under-
provision of information compared to money, we set up a new experimental
study with new subjects, described in the following section.
2.5.3 PROVISION OF INFORMATION WITH LOW IMPLICIT
COSTS
To investigate the finding that with zero explicit net provision costs, pro-
vision levels are higher in the money condition than in the information
condition, we set up a new experimental study with new subjects to test
whether this effect is primarily driven by the implicit costs in the informa-
tion condition. In this new experiment, we replicate the design described
above (see Section 2.4), but with a reduced set of questions. We reduced
the set of items in the information condition to the 10 questions with the
lowest combined measure of cognitive and emotional load (see upper part of
Table 2.3) and accordingly reduced the endowment in the money condition
12However, both measures are significantly correlated (Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient between mean cognitive load and mean emotional load: 50.85%, p=0.0221).
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to 10 units. The new experiment comprises four treatments, summarized
in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Treatments reduced condition.
information money
cost INFO RED MONEY RED
no cost INFO RED NC MONEY RED NC
To ensure payoff equivalence between all treatments, the marginal pay-
offs are doubled (compare Table 2.7). All other parameters remain un-
changed.13
Table 2.7: Marginal payoffs reduced condition.
cost condition no cost condition
self others self others
item/unit kept e0.60 e0.00 e0.60 e0.00
item/unit provided e0.24 e0.24 e0.60 e0.24
Overall, 212 subjects participated in the four treatments of the reduced
question set experiment. To enable the statistical comparison between the
four main treatments and the treatments of the reduced question set ex-
periment, in the following we present provision levels as percentages of
endowments (relative provision levels).
Table 2.8 contains three observations in support of our hypothesis that
the high implicit provision costs induce the under-provision of items in
INFO NC as compared to the observed provision of money in MONEY NC.
13The procedure in the reduced question set experiment followed the same protocol as
in the four main treatments (see Section 2.4.3). All sessions were conducted during 2013.
Overall, 212 subjects participated with 59% female and 41% male, and most participants
were students from economics, social sciences and business administration. In the reduced
question set experiment, on average participants earned e10.20 in INFO RED (min:
e5.70; max: e15.00), e15.20 in INFO RED NC (min: e13.10; max: e15.70), e9.70
in MONEY RED (min: e6.40; max: e14.80), and e15.50 in MONEY RED NC (min:
e14.50; max: e15.70) including the show-up fee of e2.50.
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Table 2.8: Relative provision levels.
information money
cost no cost cost no cost
main 46.15% 89.02% 40.58% 96.44%
reduced 45.71% 92.50% 33.46% 97.50%
Notes: The table reports provision levels as percentages
of endowment (=20 in main, =10 in reduced).
First, we see that when the questions in the information treatments only
concern the items with low implicit provision costs (INFO RED NC), rela-
tive provision levels are weakly significantly higher than in the full question
set INFO NC (p=0.0998) in the no cost condition. Second, we observe
that this is only true for information, but not for money. Here, relative
provision levels are not significantly different between MONEY NC and
MONEY RED NC (p=0.4950). Third, when explicit net cost are zero, we
do not observe the under-provision (compared to money) we observe in the
full question set. Relative provision levels are not significantly different be-
tween INFO RED NC and MONEY RED NC (p=0.2322).
Result 4. If subjects are only confronted with items with low implicit
provision costs, there is no statistically significant difference between the
provision of information and money. In particular, there no longer is under-
provision in case of zero explicit net costs.
In Table 2.9, we provide the results from a probit regression that is run
on our observations in INFO RED and INFO RED NC, and replicates the
analysis of Table 2.5 in Section 2.5.2. Again, the dependent variable is
the likelihood of item provision. As before, the explicit monetary provision
cost has a significant negative effect on the likelihood of item provision. The
results replicate our findings summarized in Result 3 that subjects engage
in selective information provision. Although subjects were only confronted
with the 10 items with the lowest intrinsic costs, there is a variance in the
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Table 2.9: Likelihood of item contribution (reduced treatments).
(1) (2)
explicit monetary provision cost -1.5789*** -1.5823***
(0 = no cost, 1 = cost) (0.26) (0.26)
combined measure cognitive and emotional load - 0.8531***
(Euclidean distance from origin) (0.16)
mean cognitive load 0.0414
(1 = very low, 6 = very high) (0.12)
mean emotional load -1.1100***
(1 = very low, 6 = very high) (0.22)
constant 2.2751*** 3.4461***
(0.30) (0.49)
number of observations 1,080 1,080
number of subjects 108 108
Pseudo-R-squared 0.2382 0.2400
Notes: Probit regression clustered by subject, robust standard errors in parentheses.
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Dependent variable: Contribution of item (0 = no,
1 = yes).
intrinsic costs and the regression shows that the higher an item scores on the
combined cognitive and emotional dimension, the less likely it is provided.
Again, the emotional load has a significant negative effect on information
provision, while the mean cognitive load is insignificant.
2.6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we experimentally study the provision of personal informa-
tion to the benefit of others, and compare this to the provision of money.
There is an important structural difference between money and informa-
tion: Information provision exhibits an implicit cost that varies with the
type of information. We account for this by including an additional cost pa-
rameter in our model and hypothesize that a player’s decision to contribute
to an information-based public good does not only depend on the explicit
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provision cost, but also on the implicit cost of information provision. This
leads to different predictions for the provision of information-based public
goods as compared to monetary public goods. If players’ information sets
strongly vary in implicit costs of information provision, information-based
public goods will be underprovided as compared to material public goods.
Further, selective information provision can be expected if the information
requested is heterogeneous in implicit provision costs.
In a laboratory experiment, we test our hypotheses using a 2×2-design
where we vary the unit of provision (information vs. money), and the ex-
plicit net provision costs (cost vs. no cost). We study real information
provision, i.e., subjects provide real personal information about their own
preferences, past behaviors and physical characteristics. In the two infor-
mation treatments, we exogenously vary the cognitive and emotional load of
the information we retrieve to induce different implicit costs of information
provision. In line with the recent experimental literature (e.g., Benndorf
and Normann, forthcoming; Schudy and Utikal, 2017; Feri et al., 2016;
Huberman et al., 2005), we observe selective information provision both in
presence and absence of explicit net provision costs. This even leads to
under-provision of information as compared to money provision when ex-
plicit net provision costs are zero. Furthermore, in line with the literature
we observe that information provision varies with incentives, i.e., we ob-
serve more information provision if explicit net costs are absent (compare
Beresford et al., 2012; Jentzsch et al., 2012; Tsai et al., 2011).14
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate information
provision that creates public benefits. We show that already in an ab-
stract laboratory setting where we can guarantee for subjects’ privacy and
data protection, and where the information we retrieve is not especially
private or complex, implicit costs lead to selective information provision.
14An interesting future direction would be to examine how subjects hold each other
responsible for under-provision of information if it is implicitly costly. As Cappelen et
al. (2010) show, the majority of subjects do not hold others responsible for impersonal
factors beyond individual control. This could also be the case if implicit costs impede
the provision of personal information. Then, one would observe lower punishment rates
in an information-based public goods game than in a money-based public goods game.
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In the most extreme case, information-based public goods are even under-
provided in comparison to material public goods. We suggest that future
research should investigate whether and how information with high implicit
provision costs can be elicited to avoid that information-based public goods
are biased.
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2.A EXPERIMENTAL APPENDIX
2.A.1 TRANSLATED INSTRUCTIONS
The instructions are translated from German. The sample instructions be-
long to treatment INFO (MONEY). All deviations in the other treatments
are given in square brackets.
Instructions of the information treatments
General information
We welcome you to this economic experiment. It is very important that
you read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, please
get in touch with us.
Depending on your own and the other participants’ decisions, you can earn
money in this experiment.
During the experiment, you are not allowed to talk to other participants
of the experiment. Non-compliance with this rule leads to exclusion from
the experiment and all payments. All decisions are made anonymously, i.e.,
none of the other participants gets to know the identity of a person who
makes a certain decision. All payments are made anonymously, too, i.e., no
participant gets to know the payoff of the other participants.
At the end of the experiment, you receive 2.50 Euro for showing up. During
the experiment, you can earn additional money. On the following pages we
explain to you the exact course of the experiment.
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Groups and rounds
• You are part of a group with a total of 4 members.
• The experiment consists of only one round.
Course of the experiment
• You receive 20 information sheets [INFO RED/INFO RED NC:
10 information sheets] in a white envelope labeled with the
word “Information”. Each of the information sheets contains a ques-
tion about you. Take out all 20 information sheets [INFO RED and
INFO RED NC: 10 information sheets] of the white envelope, and
decide for each of the information sheets whether you want to pro-
vide the information about you for the group or keep it for
yourself :
– If you provide your information for the group, the whole group
profits from this. For this purpose, please write the truthful an-
swer to the question on the information sheet. Please put the an-
swered information sheet back into the white envelope. For each
answered information sheet which you put into the white en-
velope, each group member (including yourself) receives
0.12 Euro [INFO RED: 0.24 Euro].
[INFO NC: For each answered information sheet which you put
into the white envelope, you yourself receive 0.30 Euro, and
each of the other three group members receives 0.12
Euro.]
[INFO RED NC: For each answered information sheet which you
put into the white envelope, you yourself receive 0.60 Euro,
and each of the other three group members receives
0.24 Euro.]
– If you keep your information to yourself, only you profit from
this. For this purpose, please leave the information sheet com-
pletely empty. Please put the empty information sheet back into
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the white envelope. For each empty information sheet you put
into the white envelope, you (but none of the other group
members) receive 0.30 Euro [INFO RED/INFO RED NC:
0.60 Euro].
• Your payoff is calculated as follows:
0.12 Euro times the number of information sheets which
you and the other member of your group
have provided for the group
[INFO RED/
INFO RED NC:
0.24 Euro]
[INFO NC/INFO RED NC: the number
of information sheets which have been pro-
vided by the other members of your group]
+
0.30 Euro times the number of information sheets you have
kept for yourself
[INFO RED:
0.60 Euro]
[INFO NC: 20 (=number of information
sheets in your envelope)]
[INFO RED NC:
0.60 Euro]
[INFO RED NC: 10 (=number of infor-
mation sheets in your envelope)]
= Your payoff
• After all participants have made their decisions, all 20 informa-
tion sheets [INFO RED/INFO RED NC: 10 information sheets]
should be put back into the white envelope.
• No participant of the experiment gets to know how many and which
information sheets the other participants have provided and how many
they have kept for themselves. Each participant only learns her own
payoff after the experiment.
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• As soon as all participants have made their decisions the lab team
collects the white envelopes.
• Then, the lab team hands out a questionnaire. Please fill in the
questionnaire while the lab team calculates your payoffs. After you
have filled in the questionnaire, please stay at your cabin until we
separately call you for payment.
Data protection
• Please note: The information about the group members which has
been put into the white envelopes will be statistically evaluated anony-
mously, and destroyed by the experimenter immediately thereafter.
At no time will information be assigned to the person of a single par-
ticipant. Information will not be passed to third parties. Information
will not be used for any other than research purpose, especially not
for any direct or indirect commercial purpose.
Good luck and thank you very much for your participation!
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Instructions of the money treatments
General information
We welcome you to this economic experiment. It is very important that
you read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, please
get in touch with us.
Depending on your own and the other participants’ decisions, you can earn
money in this experiment.
During the experiment, you are not allowed to talk to other participants
of the experiment. Non-compliance with this rule leads to exclusion from
the experiment and all payments. All decisions are made anonymously, i.e.,
none of the other participants gets to know the identity of a person who
makes a certain decision. All payments are made anonymously, too, i.e., no
participant gets to know the payoff of the other participants.
At the end of the experiment, you receive 2.50 Euro for showing up. During
the experiment, you can earn additional money. On the following pages we
explain to you the exact course of the experiment.
Groups and rounds
• You are part of a group with a total of 4 members.
• The experiment consists of only one round.
Course of the experiment
• You receive 20 money sheets [MONEY RED/MONEY RED NC:
10 money sheets] in a blue envelope labeled with the word “Money”.
Take out all 20 money sheets [MONEY RED and MONEY RED NC:
10 money sheets] of the blue envelope, and decide for each of the
money sheets whether you want to provide the money for the
group or keep it for yourself :
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– If you provide your money for the group, the whole group prof-
its from this. For this purpose, please write the word “GROUP”
on the money sheet. Please put the labeled money sheet back
into the blue envelope. For each labeled money sheet which you
put into the blue envelope, each group member (including
yourself) receives 0.12 Euro [MONEY RED: 0.24 Euro].
[MONEY NC: For each labeled money sheet which you put into
the blue envelope, you yourself receive 0.30 Euro, and each
of the other three group members receives 0.12 Euro.]
[MONEY RED NC: For each labeled money sheet which you put
into the blue envelope, you yourself receive 0.60 Euro, and
each of the other three group members receives 0.24
Euro.]
– If you keep your money to yourself, only you profit from this.
For this purpose, please leave the money sheet completely empty.
Please put the empty money sheet back into the blue envelope.
For each empty money sheet you put into the blue envelope,
you (but none of the other group members) receive 0.30
Euro [MONEY RED/MONEY RED NC: 0.60 Euro].
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• Your payoff is calculated as follows:
0.12 Euro times the number of money sheets which you
and the other member of your group have
provided for the group
[MONEY RED/
MONEY RED NC:
0.24 Euro]
[MONEY NC/MONEY RED NC: the
number of money sheets which have been
provided by the other members of your
group]
+
0.30 Euro times the number of money sheets you have kept
for yourself
[MONEY RED:
0.60 Euro]
[MONEY NC: 20 (=number of money
sheets in your envelope)]
[MONEY RED NC:
0.60 Euro]
[MONEY RED NC: 10 (=number of
money sheets in your envelope)]
= Your payoff
• After all participants have made their decisions, all 20 money sheets
[MONEY RED/MONEY RED NC: 10 money sheets] should be
put back into the blue envelope.
• No participant of the experiment gets to know how many money sheets
the other participants have provided and how many they have kept
for themselves. Each participant only learns her own payoff after
the experiment.
• As soon as all participants have made their decisions the lab team
collects the blue envelopes.
• Then, the lab team hands out a questionnaire. Please fill in the
questionnaire while the lab team calculates your payoffs. After you
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have filled in the questionnaire, please stay at your cabin until we
separately call you for payment.
Good luck and thank you very much for your participation!
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2.A.2 SURVEY STUDY
The questionnaire from the survey study contained all 20 items as given in
Table 2.3.
Translated questionnaire from survey study
Are you male or female?
◦ male ◦ female
How old are you?
What is your subject of study?
Dear students,
in this questionnaire, we would like to
ask you to evaluate 20 questions for a
research project of the Chair in Experi-
mental and Behavioral Economics. For
this purpose, please read each question
carefully and then indicate how you
evaluate the question.
Thank you very much for your partici-
pation!
When answering this question...
What is your size? ...I have to think... ...I feel...
very little very hard very comfortable very uncomfortable
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
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2.A.3 PICTURES
Figure 2.A.1: Envelope information treatments.
Figure 2.A.2: Envelope money treatments.
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Figure 2.A.3: Information sheets.
Figure 2.A.4: Money sheets.
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chapter 3
PAYING WITH YOUR INFORMATION: THE
EFFICIENCY-ENHANCING EFFECTS OF DATA
PROVISION
Abstract
Internet services are often free of charge, but ask for customers’
personal data in exchange for usage. Collecting personal data enables
service providers to improve services to the benefit of customers,
but also increases the providers’ profits. We experimentally study
whether the provision of information-based public goods is suscep-
tible to gains of a “big player”. We find that in presence of a “big
player” the provision of personal information is more efficient than
the provision of money. Our results demonstrate that collecting per-
sonal data instead of charging user fees may be profitable both for
the service provider and the customer.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Asking for customers’ personal data in exchange for the usage of Internet
services is ubiquitous. The quality of services improves in customers’ will-
ingness to share their personal data. The more users enable the collection
of their location data, the more accurate is the traffic information by nav-
igation apps. The more users enable the collection of their contact data,
the higher is the quality of job suggestions by networks for professionals.
While the provision of personal data benefits the collective of customers,
it also generates extensive profits for the service provider. We can hardly
object that “data are becoming the new raw material of business”, “an eco-
nomic input almost on a par with capital and labour”.1 Without exception,
1http://www.economist.com/node/15557443
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the five most valuable firms worldwide are providers of internet services or
data-driven businesses.2 The question is whether awareness of the extensive
profits of the service provider may crowd-out the willingness of customers
to share their personal data to the benefit of others.
In this paper, we experimentally study how the willingness to provide
personal information to information-based public goods varies with the pres-
ence of a “big player”. Experimental subjects provide real personal infor-
mation (e.g., about past behavior or physical characteristics). In analogy
to providers of internet services, a “big player” creates value from the pro-
vided information, which is partly distributed among the contributors (i.e.,
by improving the service), but to a large extent kept by the big player.
As a control, we study an information-based public good with the same
benefits for the subjects, but without a big player. In this treatment, the
surplus from provision is directly distributed among contributors. To con-
trol for the effects of information as the unit of provision, we study the same
two scenarios (with and without a big player) with money as the unit of
provision.
We find that the provision of information is less susceptible to the gains
of a big player than the provision of money. In the experiment, the presence
of the big player crowds out the willingness to provide money, but no such
effect is observed for information. Our results demonstrate that the collec-
tion of personal data may generate more social surplus than the collection
of user fees. Thus, the benefits from data collection reach far beyond the
mere improvement of services. Given the current privacy and data secu-
rity debate, we conclude that policymakers are well-advised to secure the
potentials of data-driven business by the development and maintenance of
mechanisms that effectively protect customers from data misuse.
2In the first quarter of 2017 Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Amazon,
Apple, Facebook and Microsoft collectively accounted for over $25bn in net profit
(https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21721656-data-economy-demands-new-
approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-valuable-resource).
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3.2 THE EXPERIMENT
We experimentally investigate whether awareness of the extensive profits
of a passive big player crowd-out the willingness to provide personal infor-
mation to information-based public goods. In the following, we present the
experimental design, our hypotheses and the experimental procedure.
3.2.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Subjects play a public goods game in groups of four active contributors and
one passive big player. The unit of provision is information. The big player
cannot contribute to the public good, but profits from the provision of in-
formation by the active group members. The four active group members
receive 10 information sheets with questions retrieving personal informa-
tion.3 To provide information to the public good, group member i has to
truthfully answer the question.
The provision of information benefits all group members as well as the
big player. For each unit provided by group member i, each of the other
group members receives a return of α = 0.24 while the big player prof-
its threefold (3α = 0.72). We assume that for the information provider,
the explicit provision cost equals the benefit from provision, i.e., the net
costs of provision are zero. If no information is provided, neither the other
group members nor the big player receive a benefit. Thus, the active group
member i’s payoff function is given by:
piai = e+ α
∑
j 6=i
number of units provided by group member j, (3.2.1)
i.e., group member i’s payoff increases in the number of units provided
by any of the other active group members j 6= i. The big player’s payoff
function is given by:
pib = e+ 3α
4∑
j=1
number of units provided by group member j. (3.2.2)
3Note that the information we retrieved is the same as in Section 2.5.3.
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The big player’s payoff increases in the number of units provided by any
of the four active group members. All group members as well as the big
player start with the same initial endowment of e = 6.
We control for the effects of the presence of the big player by a baseline
treatment without a big player. In the baseline treatment, the active group
members’ payoff function piai is identical to that in the big player treatment
(compare Equation 3.2.2). To control for effects of information as the unit
of provision, we set up two additional treatments (with and without a big
player) where money is the unit of provision. In an otherwise identical
environment, subjects receive 10 money sheets. To provide a money sheet
to the public good, group member i has to write the word “GROUP” on it.
The resulting four treatments are summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Treatments.
information money
baseline INFO BASE MONEY BASE
big player INFO BIG MONEY BIG
Note that treatment INFO BASE and MONEY BASE are identical to
INFO RED NC and MONEY RED NC in Section 2.5.3. We use the data
of the no cost treatments of experiment in Section 2.5.3 as the baseline
observations in the present study since there are no differences in the pro-
vision of information and money. This allows for a controlled comparison
of information and money provision in presence of the big player.
3.2.2 HYPOTHESES
Since the net provision cost is zero, any combination of provision levels is
in equilibrium, both in the information and money treatments. If subjects
care about others’ payoffs, it is likely that the equilibrium with full provi-
sion is selected. The presence of the big player does not make a difference
under the assumption of standard preferences. Predictions change if we as-
sume that players hold other-regarding preferences and are inequality-averse
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with regard to monetary outcomes (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999). Then, full provision no longer is in equilibrium in the big
player treatments. Since all group members as well as the big player start
with the same initial endowment of e, and given the higher return for the
big player, any unit provided increases the difference in outcomes between
the big player and the provider. Hence, provision to the public good always
makes an inequality-averse player worse off. Engel and Rockenbach (2011)
provide experimental evidence that indeed subjects’ willingness to provide
money to a material public good is lower if there are positive externalities
on wealthy third parties. We expect lower average provision levels in the
big player treatments than in the baseline treatments.
Hypothesis 1. Average provision levels are lower in the big player
treatments than in the baseline treatments.
Since for both units of provision (information and money) the payoff
functions are identical, outcome-based theories yield the same predictions
and lead us to expect no differences between the provision of information
and money.
Hypothesis 2. Average provision levels do not differ between the in-
formation and money treatments.
3.2.3 PROCEDURE
We collected one-shot paper-and-pencil decisions. By conducting one-shot
experiments, we ensured statistical independence of all observations. A
total of 192 participants (57% female and 43% male) participated in the
experiment. All sessions were conducted in 2013 in the Cologne Labo-
ratory for Economic Research (CLER), University of Cologne, Germany.
We recruited our participants using the Online Recruitment System for
Economic Experiments (Greiner, 2015). Written instructions informed the
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participants about the course of the experiment.4 We ensured that answers
to the questions in the information treatments could not be ascribed to a
participant’s identity. This was stated clearly in the instructions. In the
big player treatments, active group members were labeled “group mem-
bers A”. The big player was labeled “group member B”. At the end of the
experiment, participants answered a short questionnaire. In this question-
naire, we also asked for participants’ beliefs regarding their group members’
decisions. Sessions lasted around one hour.
On average, participants earned e15.20 in INFO BASE (min: e13.10;
max: 15.70), e15.10 in INFO BIG (min: e13.10; max: e15.70), e15.50 in
MONEY BASE (min: e14.50; max: e15.70), and e14.00 in MONEY BIG
(min: e9.70; max: e15.70). In comparison, big players earned more than
twice as much. On average, big players earned e34.90 in INFO BIG (min:
e29.40; max: e37.30), and e30.40 in MONEY BIG (min: e19.30; max:
e37.3) including the show-up fee of e2.50.
In addition to the 52 independent observations in treatment INFO BASE
and MONEY BASE (compare section 2.5.3), we collected 44 independent
observations in treatment INFO BIG and MONEY BIG. Furthermore, eleven
passive big players participated in INFO BIG and MONEY BIG. If not
stated otherwise, statistical comparisons between treatments are based on
two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests (MWU).
3.3 RESULTS
In Figure 3.1, average provision levels are given by treatment. Evidently,
the average provision level is close to full provision in both information
treatments. Interestingly, we find that there is no significant difference be-
tween average provision levels in INFO BASE (9.25) and INFO BIG (9.16,
two-sided MWU-test: p=0.8989). This result is in contrast to Hypothesis 1.
4Translated instructions can be found in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.1: Average provision levels.
Result 1. Information provision does not differ significantly between
the baseline and big player condition.
To examine whether the unit of provision drives this result, we compare
average provision levels in the information treatments to the money treat-
ments. In contrast to Hypothesis 2, we find that in the big player treat-
ments money is significantly under-provided as compared to information
(p=0.0351). However, in the baseline treatments there is no significant dif-
ference between the provision of information and money (p=0.2322). This
is in line with Hypothesis 2.
Result 2. In absence of the big player, information and money provision
do not differ significantly. In presence of the big player, money provision is
significantly lower than information provision.
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If we compare average provision levels between the two money treat-
ments, we find significantly lower average provision levels in MONEY BIG
(7.59) than in MONEY BASE (9.75, p=0.0006). This result supports Hy-
pothesis 1.
Result 3. Money provision is significantly lower in the big player con-
dition than in the baseline condition.
3.4 CONCLUSION
While the collection of personal data in exchange for the usage of Internet
services is ubiquitous, it is unknown whether this form of payment is more
or less efficient than the charging of monetary user fees. In a laboratory
experiment, we show that information provision is less susceptible to the
gains of a big player than the provision of money. Since both the providers
of information and the big player benefit from an overall higher provision
level, this is beneficial to all parties. In the experiment, the presence of
the big player crowds out the willingness to provide money. Information
provision does not vary with the presence of the big player.
Our experimental results are in line with the empirical observation that
people willingly provide their personal data in exchange for the usage of In-
ternet services. Therein, the potential gains of service providers who collect
and use the data for their own business undertakings seems to be of mi-
nor importance. All actors involved benefit from this situation. Customers
gain from an increased quality of data-based services, and firms realize rents
from data collection. From a business perspective, our experiment confirms
the profitability of asking for customers’ personal data instead of charg-
ing user fees. However, in light of the recent privacy and data protection
debate, these mutual benefits for firms and customers seem to be at risk.
We conclude that policymakers are well-advised to secure the potentials of
data-driven business by the development and maintenance of mechanisms
that effectively protect customers from data misuse.
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3.A EXPERIMENTAL APPENDIX
3.A.1 TRANSLATED INSTRUCTIONS
The instructions are translated from German. For the instructions of
INFO BASE and MONEY BASE, see translated instructions of the
INFO RED NC and MONEY RED NC treatments in Section 2.A.1.
Instructions of INFO BIG
General information
We welcome you to this economic experiment. It is very important that
you read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, please
get in touch with us.
Depending on your own and the other participants’ decisions, you can earn
money in this experiment.
During the experiment, you are not allowed to talk to other participants
of the experiment. Non-compliance with this rule leads to exclusion from
the experiment and all payments. All decisions are made anonymously, i.e.,
none of the other participants gets to know the identity of a person who
makes a certain decision. All payments are made anonymously, too, i.e., no
participant gets to know the payoff of the other participants.
At the end of the experiment, you receive 2.50 Euro for showing up. During
the experiment, you can earn additional money. On the following pages we
explain to you the exact course of the experiment.
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Groups and rounds
• In this experiment, there are two types of participants, group mem-
ber A and group member B. At the beginning of the experiment
it is randomly determined whether you are group member A or B.
• Each group consists of 5 group members, 4 group members A and 1
group member B. At the beginning of the experiment, group member
B receives an initial endowment of 6.00 Euro.
• The experiment consists of only one round.
Course of the experiment
• Each group member A receives 10 information sheets in a
white envelope labeled with the word “Information”. Each of the
information sheets contains a question about the respective group
member. Each of the group members A takes out all 10 information
sheets of the white envelope, and decides for each of the informa-
tion sheets whether she wants to provide the information about
herself for the group or keep it for herself :
– If a group member A provides her information, the whole group
including group member B profits from this. For this pur-
pose, group member A writes the truthful answer to the question
on the information sheet. Group member A puts the answered
information sheet back into the white envelope. From the an-
swered information sheets that the group members A have put
into the white envelopes, an anonymized frequency statistic
about the provided information is generated for group
member B. For each answered information sheet, group mem-
ber B receives 2.04 Euro at the end of the experiment,
whereof 1.) she keeps 0.72 Euro for herself, 2.) has to give
0.60 Euro to the group member A who has provided
the respective information sheet, and 3.) has to give 0.24
Euro to each of the other group members A.
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– If a group member A keeps her information for herself, only this
group member A herself profits from this. For this pur-
pose, group member A leaves the information sheet completely
empty. Group member A puts the empty information sheet back
into the white envelope. For each empty information sheet group
member A puts into the white envelope, this group member
herself (but neither group member B nor any of the
other group members A) receives 0.60 Euro.
• Group member B also receives a white envelope labeled with the
word “Information”. Group member B waits while the group members
A finish their information sheets.
• The payoff of a group member A is calculated as follows:
0.24 Euro times the number of information sheets which
have been provided by the other group
members A
+
0.60 Euro times 10 (= number of information sheets in the
envelope)
= group member A’s payoff
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• The payoff of group member B is calculated as follows:
6.00 Euro initial endowment
+
2.04 Euro times number of information sheets that have
been provided by all group members A
-
(1 × 0.60 Euro times number of information sheets that have
been provided by all group members A
+
3 × 0,24 Euro)
= 6.00 Euro
+ 0.72 Euro times number of information sheets that have
been provided by all group members A
= Group member B’s payoff
• After all group members A have made their decisions, all 10 informa-
tion sheets should be put back into the white envelope. The
lab team collects the white envelopes and generates the anonymized
frequency statistic about the provided information of the
group members A for group member B. After that, the lab team
hands out white envelopes to all participants. Group member B
receives the anonymized frequency statistic about the provided infor-
mation of the group members A in this envelope.
• No group member A gets to know how many and which information
sheets the other group members A have provided and how many they
have kept for themselves. Group member B only gets to know how
many information sheets the group members A have provided, but
does not learn the identity of a certain group member A that has
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provided a certain number of information sheets. Each group member
only learns her own payoff after the experiment.
• After the lab team has collected the white envelopes, all group mem-
bers receive a questionnaire. Please fill in the questionnaire while
the lab team calculates your payoffs. After you have filled in the ques-
tionnaire, please stay at your cabin until we separately call you for
payment.
Data protection
• Please note: The information about the group members which has
been put into the white envelopes will be statistically evaluated anony-
mously, and destroyed by the experimenter immediately thereafter.
At no time will information be assigned to the person of a single par-
ticipant. Information will not be passed to third parties. Information
will not be used for any other than research purpose, especially not
for any direct or indirect commercial purpose.
Good luck and thank you very much for your participation!
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Instructions of MONEY BIG
General information
We welcome you to this economic experiment. It is very important that
you read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, please
get in touch with us.
Depending on your own and the other participants’ decisions, you can earn
money in this experiment.
During the experiment, you are not allowed to talk to other participants
of the experiment. Non-compliance with this rule leads to exclusion from
the experiment and all payments. All decisions are made anonymously, i.e.,
none of the other participants gets to know the identity of a person who
makes a certain decision. All payments are made anonymously, too, i.e., no
participant gets to know the payoff of the other participants.
At the end of the experiment, you receive 2.50 Euro for showing up. During
the experiment, you can earn additional money. On the following pages we
explain to you the exact course of the experiment.
Groups and rounds
• In this experiment, there are two types of participants, group mem-
ber A and group member B. At the beginning of the experiment
it is randomly determined whether you are group member A or B.
• Each group consists of 5 group members, 4 group members A and 1
group member B. At the beginning of the experiment, group member
B receives an initial endowment of 6.00 Euro.
• The experiment consists of only one round.
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Course of the experiment
• Each group member A receives 10 money sheets in a blue en-
velope labeled with the word “Money”. Each of the group members
A takes out all 10 money sheets of the blue envelope, and decides for
each of the money sheets whether she wants to provide the money
for the group or keep it for herself :
– If a group member A provides her money, the whole group
including group member B profits from this. For this pur-
pose, group member A writes the word “GROUP” on the money
sheet. Group member A puts the labeled money sheet back into
the blue envelope. From the labeled money sheets that the group
members A have put into the blue envelopes, an anonymized
frequency statistic about the provided money is gener-
ated for group member B. For each labeled money sheet,
group member B receives 2.04 Euro at the end of the
experiment, whereof 1.) she keeps 0.72 Euro for herself, 2.)
has to give 0.60 Euro to the group member A who has
provided the respective money sheet, and 3.) has to give
0.24 Euro to each of the other group members A.
– If a group member A keeps her money for herself, only this
group member A herself profits from this. For this pur-
pose, group member A leaves the money sheet completely empty.
Group member A puts the empty money sheet back into the
blue envelope. For each empty money sheet group member A
puts into the blue envelope, this group member herself (but
neither group member B nor any of the other group
members A) receives 0.60 Euro.
• Group member B also receives a blue envelope labeled with the
word “Money”. Group member B waits while the group members A
finish their money sheets.
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• The payoff of a group member A is calculated as follows:
0.24 Euro times the number of money sheets which have
been provided by the other group mem-
bers A
+
0.60 Euro times 10 (= number of money sheets in the en-
velope)
= group member A’s payoff
• The payoff of group member B is calculated as follows:
6.00 Euro initial endowment
+
2.04 Euro times number of money sheets that have been
provided by all group members A
-
(1 × 0.60 Euro times number of money sheets that have been
provided by all group members A
+
3 × 0,24 Euro)
= 6.00 Euro
+ 0.72 Euro times number of money sheets that have been
provided by all group members A
= Group member B’s payoff
• After all group members A have made their decisions, all 10 money
sheets should be put back into the blue envelope. The lab
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team collects the blue envelopes and generates the anonymized fre-
quency statistic about the provided money of the group mem-
bers A for group member B. After that, the lab team hands out
blue envelopes to all participants. Group member B receives the
anonymized frequency statistic about the provided money of the group
members A in this envelope.
• No group member A gets to know how many money sheets the other
group members A have provided and how many they have kept for
themselves. Group member B only gets to know how many money
sheets the group members A have provided, but does not learn the
identity of a certain group member A that has provided a certain
number of money sheets. Each group member only learns her own
payoff after the experiment.
• After the lab team has collected the blue envelopes, all group mem-
bers receive a questionnaire. Please fill in the questionnaire while
the lab team calculates your payoffs. After you have filled in the ques-
tionnaire, please stay at your cabin until we separately call you for
payment.
Good luck and thank you very much for your participation!
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Frequency statistics for big player (information condition)
In the experiment, the bars were colored according to the number of group
members A who provided a certain number of units.
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Frequency statistics for big player (money condition)
In the experiment, the bars were colored according to the number of group
members A who provided a certain item.
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3.A.2 PICTURES
Figure 3.A.1: Envelope information treatments.
Figure 3.A.2: Envelope money treatments.
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Figure 3.A.3: Information sheets.
Figure 3.A.4: Money sheets.
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chapter 4
COOPERATION AND THE PROSPECT OF COMPETING
OVER JOINTLY CREATED SURPLUS
Abstract
Frequently, surplus from cooperation is subject to subsequent
competition. Co-workers engage in teamwork and firms engage in
joint innovation, and then compete for a share of a team bonus or
industry profit. Steep incentives (e.g., provided by competitive pro-
motion schemes or patent systems) may lead to an unwillingness to
cooperate in the first place. I experimentally study the willingness
to cooperate under the prospect of competing in a winner-take-all
contest. In comparison to a proportional-share contest, the level of
cooperation more than halves from 81% to 38% in this situation.
The results demonstrate that steep incentives may seriously impede
cooperation.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Cooperation frequently creates surplus that is subject to subsequent com-
petition. Especially in knowledge-intensive production (e.g., team work,
research collaborations, joint innovation), individual contributions to joint
production may be ex post unverifiable. Then, former cooperators engage
in competitive rent-seeking to secure their share of the jointly created sur-
plus (e.g., team members report their contributions to a joint project to
secure their share of a team bonus, and firms increase their market sup-
ply to secure their share of industry profit). A problem may arise if the
acquired share does not reflect the initial investment into cooperation (see
Bayer, 2016).
Steep incentives are ubiquitous in the organizational structure of firms
and in the industry. Tournament-like reward schemes and competitive
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promotion systems are installed to enhance worker productivity. Patent
systems are implemented to foster technological progress. However, steep
incentives may have adverse effects with regard to joint surplus creation.
In the most extreme case, individuals can obtain exclusive rights over the
jointly created surplus, leaving former cooperators uncompensated for their
engagement. The question is whether steep incentives affect the willingness
to cooperate in the first place.
In this paper, I provide evidence from a controlled laboratory experi-
ment that investigates the emergence of cooperation in a two-stage game
of cooperation and competition. The cooperation stage is implemented
in a two-player threshold public goods game. Only if the group members
contribute enough to a group project, they enter the competition stage.
The competition stage is implemented in a generic contest game. In an
otherwise identical environment, I systematically vary the allocation of sur-
plus in the competition stage. In one treatment, cooperation creates a
divisible rent that is allocated proportionally to the group members’ invest-
ments (proportional-share mechanism). This treatment depicts a situation
in which team members report their contributions to a joint project to se-
cure a share of a team bonus, or in which firms set their market supply to
secure a share of the industry profit. In the other treatment, cooperation
creates an indivisible rent that is acquired by the winner of a lottery contest
(winner-take-all mechanism). This treatment depicts a situation in which
individual team members compete for promotion, or in which firms apply
for patents. The contest environment allows for a controlled examination of
the impact of different allocation rules on cooperation since the equilibrium
predictions, best responses and expected equilibrium payoffs are equivalent
between the proportional-share and the winner-take-all contest. Further-
more, parameters are chosen such that cooperation is also an equilibrium
in both treatments if players are risk-averse. By the present study, I aim at
answering the following research question: Does the prospect of competing
in a winner-take-all competition impede the willingness to cooperate?
I find that in comparison to the proportional-share mechanism, the
winner-take-all mechanism indeed reduces cooperation from 81% to 38%.
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Interestingly, this result cannot be explained by differences in decision-
making in the competition stage. There are differences in the cooperation
stage, however. Already in the first period, significantly less subjects co-
operate in the winner-take-all treatment as compared to the proportional-
share treatment. However, this effect alone cannot explain the treatment
effect. Earning less than the other group member significantly decreases
the willingness to cooperate, but only the experience of being unable to
recoup investments into cooperation can explain the treatment effect on
cooperation.
This study shows that although winner-take-all competition likely elic-
its high individual investments, it seemingly can adverse effects on joint
investments. From the results of this paper, it becomes clear that steep
incentives may impede the emergence of cooperation. Thus, whenever joint
production is desirable, organizations and regulators are well-advised to
take into account that winner-take-all competition may have detrimental
effects on cooperation. From a more general perspective, it seems that the
economic costs of the “winner-take-all society” (Frank and Cook, 1995) may
be severely underestimated if we do not consider the cooperation that does
not take place.
4.2 RELATED LITERATURE
The debate concerning the economic costs of winner-take-all competition
has a long tradition in economics and related fields.1 However, although
competition for jointly generated surplus is ubiquitous in many organiza-
tional settings and markets, the interaction between surplus generation and
surplus sharing has received only limited attention in the experimental eco-
nomics literature. To the best of my knowledge, there exists only one exper-
imental study that focuses on the interaction between surplus generation
and surplus sharing. Bayer (2016) investigates the willingness to cooper-
ate when the surplus from cooperation is allocated in a proportional-share
1For an extensive discussion of the economic costs of the “winner-take-all society”,
see Frank and Cook (1995).
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contest. The rent in the contest linearly increases in subjects’ contributions
into cooperation. Bayer (2016) finds strong cooperation in this setting.
In contrast to the present paper, Bayer (2016) does not contrast cooper-
ation under the prospect of competing in a proportional-share contest to
competing in a winner-take-all contest.
Another related paper investigates decision-making in strategic alliances
(Ke et al., 2013). Although the focus of their study is not on joint surplus
generation, Ke et al. (2013) also combine cooperative elements and com-
petition. In the first stage, two players form a strategic alliance and jointly
compete against a third player in a lottery contest. The probability of
winning depends on the total investment into competition by the alliance
members and the third player. If the alliance wins, the alliance members
compete against each other in a second lottery contest. Ke et al. (2013) find
that investments in the first stage are lower under the prospect of winner-
take-all competition as compared to the prospect of an equal split of the
prize. However, with regard to the research question of this paper, no gen-
eral conclusions can be drawn from the results of Bayer (2016) and Ke et al.
(2013). In the former study, the prize increases linearly in contributions to
cooperation while in the latter study, the game entails additional stochastic
and strategic uncertainty.
Another strand of literature that is relevant with regard to the present
study focuses on behavioral spillovers from cooperation on competition (and
vice versa) in market environments (Brandts and Riedl, 2017; Cason and
Gangadharan, 2013; Nicklisch, 2012; Suetens, 2008), and organizational
settings (Buser and Dreber, 2015; Burks et al., 2009). The findings by
these studies corroborate the hypothesis that winner-take-all competition
may have negative effects on cooperation. For instance, Brandts and Riedl
(2017), Buser and Dreber (2015), Cason and Gangadharan (2013) and
Burks et al. (2009) provide evidence of negative spillovers from compe-
tition on cooperation when competition leads to very unequal outcomes. In
contrast, Nicklisch (2012) and Suetens (2008) find positive spillovers from
cooperation on competition when competition leads to rather equal out-
comes.
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A different line of experimental research which is also relevant with re-
gard to the present study focuses on decision-making in contests. It is
a well-known phenomenon that subjects engage in overinvestment (i.e., in-
vestments are higher than the Nash equilibrium prediction) and overspread-
ing (i.e., investments cover the entire strategy space) in experimental con-
tests (for a review, see Dechenaux et al., 2015; Sheremeta, 2013). Cason et
al. (2010) provide evidence that if given the choice to opt out, subjects less
frequently enter a winner-take-all than a proportional-share contest. With
regard to differences in decision-making in winner-take-all and proportional-
share contests, experimental evidence is mixed. Some studies report sig-
nificantly higher investments in winner-take-all than in proportional-share
contests (e.g., Cason et al., 2013; Eisenkopf and Teyssier, 2013). Others
find no or only limited support that investments differ (e.g., Chowdhury
et al., 2014; Masiliunas et al., 2014; Fallucchi et al., 2013; Shupp et al.,
2013). With regard to the present study, differences in decision-making in
the competition stage could have an impact on the willingness to cooperate.
Thus, I set up two control treatments to account for these differences.
4.3 THE MODEL
To address my research question, I set up a two-stage game of cooperation
and competition. Holding everything else constant, I vary the allocation
mechanism in the competition stage. In Section 4.3.1, I show that under
(risk-neutral) standard preferences and expected payoff maximization, the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria are identical between the two games. In
Section 4.3.2, I show that cooperation is a subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
rium also under the assumption of risk aversion. The two stages of the
game are given by:
1) Cooperation stage. Two players form a group and simultaneously de-
cide how many points ai of their endowment A to contribute to a
group project and how many points to keep for themselves. The
group project is only successful if total contributions a1 +a2 are equal
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to or exceed a threshold T . No refund is paid if the group project is
not successful, and no rebate is paid on excessive contributions.
2) Competition stage. If a1 + a2 ≥ T , the group project is successful
and the two players enter the competition stage. In the competition
stage, each of the two players receives an endowment B. The two
players simultaneously decide how many points bi to invest into the
acquisition of a prize V . Competition takes place in a contest with a
winner-take-all or proportional-share allocation mechanism.
Player i’s payoff function of the two-stage game is given by:
Ωi(ai, aj, bi, bj) =
A− ai + ωi(bi, bj) if a1 + a2 ≥ TA− ai if a1 + a2 < T.
ωi(bi, bj) denotes the payoff player i realizes in the competition stage. I
study competition in a contest environment following Tullock (1980). Player
i’s expected payoff in the competition stage is given by:
E [ωi(bi, bj)] = B + pi(bi, bj)V − bi.
The contest success function for both mechanisms is given by:
pi(bi, bj) =

bi
bi+bj if b1 + b2 > 0
0 otherwise.
In the winner-take-all mechanism, the contest success function defines
the probability that player i wins the prize. In the proportional-share
mechanism, the contest success function defines the proportion of the prize
awarded to player i. The resulting payoff in the winner-take-all competition
is given by:
ωi(bi, bj) =
B − bi + V if player i winsB − bi if player i does not win.
In the proportional-share competition, the payoff is given by:
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ωi(bi, bj) = B − bi + bi
bi + bj
V.
I assume that A < T < 2A, meaning that (1) the group project is
never successful if only one player contributes a positive amount, and (2)
that group members do not have to contribute their entire endowment A
to make the group project successful. Further, I assume that B = T2 and
V ≥ B. The game is solved via backward induction.
4.3.1 STANDARD PREFERENCES
In the following, I focus on pure-strategy equilibria. Under the assump-
tion of standard preferences and expected payoff maximization, the stage
equilibrium of the competition stage is unique (Szidarovszky and Okuguchi,
1997) and given by equilibrium investments of:
b∗i = b∗j =
1
4V.
This stage equilibrium holds for all first stage outcomes with ai+aj ≥ T
since the threshold interaction in the first stage makes the second stage
history-independent.2 Expected equilibrium payoffs in the competition
stage are given by:
E
[
ωi(b∗i , b∗j)
]
= B + 14V.
Player i never contributes more in the first stage than she expects to
earn in the second stage. The two-stage game has multiple subgame perfect
Nash equilibria (SPNE) that can be classified by a set of cooperative pure-
strategy SPNE and one uncooperative pure-strategy SPNE.
Proposition 1. We have a set of cooperative SPNE with equilibrium
investments of b∗i = b∗j = 14V in the competition stage, and equilibrium
contributions of a∗i + a∗j = T where a∗i , a∗j ∈ [T − (B + 14V ), B + 14V ] in
the cooperation stage. Furthermore, we have one uncooperative SPNE with
2The second stage in the game presented by Bayer (2016) is not history-independent
since the size of the prize in the second stage depends on contributions in the first stage.
69
equilibrium investments of b∗i = b∗j = 14V in the competition stage, and
equilibrium contributions of a∗i = a∗j = 0 in the cooperation stage.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.3.2 RISK AVERSION
The above SPNE predictions rely on the assumption of risk neutrality. How-
ever, under the given assumptions, cooperation is also a SPNE under the
assumption of risk aversion. If players are risk-averse, expected utility in
the winner-take-all competition is given by:
EU [ωi(bi, bj)] = − bi
bi + bj
e−η(B−bi+V ) − bj
bi + bj
e−η(B−bi)
where 0 < η < 1 measures the player’s constant absolute risk aversion
(compare Cornes and Hartley, 2003). In the winner-take-all mechanism,
the Nash equilibrium prediction for the competition stage is given by:
b∗i = b∗j =
1
2
−1 + eηV
η(1 + eηV ) ,
Equilibrium investments are lower than under risk neutrality for any
η > 0 (compare Abbink et al., 2010). The overall expected utility for both
stages in the winner-take-all mechanism is given by:
EU
[
Ωi(ai, aj, b∗i , b∗j)
]
=12
(
−e−η(A−ai+B−
1
2
−1+eηV
η(1+eηV )
+V )
)
+12
(
−e−η(A−ai+B−
1
2
−1+eηV
η(1+eηV )
)
.
In the competition stage with proportional-share mechanism, a risk-
averse player’s expected utility is given by:
EU [ωi(bi, bj)] = −e−η(B−bi+
bi
bi+bj
V )
.
The Nash equilibrium prediction is the same as under the assumption
of risk neutrality, i.e., b∗i = b∗j = 14V .
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The overall expected utility for both stages in the proportional-share
mechanism is given by:
EU
[
Ωi(ai, aj, b∗i , b∗j)
]
= −e−η(A−ai+B+ 14V ).
If she chooses not to contribute to the group project at all, a risk-averse
player i’s utility is given by:
U = −e−ηA.
Figure 4.1: Cutoff contribution under risk aversion (A=75, B=50, V=100).
To determine the set of SPNE under risk aversion, the cutoff contribu-
tion has to be determined that exactly equals the utility from not coop-
erating with the expected utility from cooperation. Expected utility from
cooperation in the proportional-share mechanism is higher than from not
cooperating as long as ai ≤ aˆ = 14V +B. In the winner-take-all mechanism,
for cooperation to be a SPNE it must hold that:
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ai ≤ a¯ = B + V + 12
2(ln(2) + ln( 11+eηV ))(1 + e
ηV ) + 1− eηV
η(1 + eηV ) .
a¯ is the cutoff contribution that exactly equals the utility from not co-
operating with the expected utility from cooperating in the winner-take-all
mechanism. The set of cooperative SPNE in the winner-take-all mechanism
becomes smaller as risk aversion increases. For cooperation to be a SPNE,
this cutoff contribution may not fall below T2 . In the limit, we get:
lim
η→∞ a¯ = B.
Hence, since B = T2 at least one cooperative pure-strategy SPNE with
a∗i = a∗j = T2 exists in the winner-take-all mechanism. For illustrative
purposes, in Figure 4.1 the cutoff contributions aˆ and a¯ are given for the
winner-take-all (solid line) and the proportional-share mechanism (dashed
line) for A = 75, B = 50 and V = 100.
4.4 THE EXPERIMENT
To study the impact of anticipated winner-take-all competition on cooper-
ation, I implement the model presented in Section 4.3 in a laboratory ex-
periment. Holding expected equilibrium payoffs constant, the experimental
treatments vary the allocation mechanism in the contest. The experiment
is implemented in a repeated strangers matching protocol. Players are ran-
domly rematched within matching groups of six in each of the 20 periods.
In the experiment, I measure cooperation by the percentage of successful
group projects, i.e., by the average success rate.
4.4.1 EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION
The experiment is implemented by the following parameterization: The
initial endowment in the cooperation stage is given by A = 75, and subjects
can contribute ai ∈ {0, 1, ..., 75} to the group project. The threshold is
set to T = 100. As outlined in the previous section, no refund is paid
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if the group project is not successful and no rebate is paid on excessive
investments (i.e., payoffs in the cooperation stage are given by the amount
the subject keeps for herself, 75− ai). If the group project is successful and
the two players enter the competition stage, each group member receives
an endowment of B = T2 = 50. Subjects can invest bi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 50} into
the acquisition of the indivisible prize (their share of the divisible prize).
The prize in the competition stage is set to V = 100. Under the given
parameterization, expected equilibrium payoffs in the competition stage
are given by E
[
ωi(b∗i , b∗j)
]
= 75.
4.4.2 TREATMENTS
I set up four treatments which are given in Table 4.1. The main treatment
variable is the allocation mechanism (proportional-share versus winner-take-
all). In addition to the two main treatments SHARE and LOTTERY, I set
up two control treatments SHARE BASE and LOTTERY BASE without
a cooperation stage to account for differences in the competition stage. In
conformity with the focal symmetric cooperative SPNE of the two-stage
game where both players contribute 50 points to the group project and
keep 25 points for themselves, subjects receive 20×(75-50)=500 points as
initial endowment in the two baseline treatments to induce equivalence of
expected equilibrium payoffs in all four treatments. The initial endowment
of 500 points cannot be invested into competition in SHARE BASE and
LOTTERY BASE.
Table 4.1: Treatments.
allocation mechanism
proportional-share winner-take-all
cooperation stage
yes SHARE LOTTERY
no SHARE BASE LOTTERY BASE
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4.4.3 HYPOTHESES
Under the assumption of risk-neutral standard preferences and expected
payoff maximization, the set of cooperative SPNE is given by investments
of b∗1 = b∗2 = 25 in the competition stage. In the cooperation stage, total
contributions are given by a∗1 + a∗2 = 100 with a∗1, a∗2 ∈ {25, ..., 75}. The un-
cooperative SPNE is given by b∗1 = b∗2 = 25 and a∗1 = a∗2 = 0 (see Proposition
1). (Expected) payoffs of the two-stage game are E
[
Ωi(a∗i , a∗j , b∗i , b∗j)
]
= 100
in the symmetric cooperative SPNE, and Ωi(a∗i , a∗j , b∗i , b∗j) = 75 in the sym-
metric uncooperative SPNE. Under the assumption of expected payoff max-
imization, the theoretical prediction does not depend on the allocation
mechanism. Further, the symmetric cooperative SPNE also exists under
risk aversion. Thus, we do not expect any differences between SHARE and
LOTTERY with respect to cooperation. The Null Hypothesis is given by:
Null Hypothesis. There is no difference in cooperation between LOT-
TERY and SHARE.
It is a well-known phenomenon that subjects engage in overinvestment
and overspreading in experimental contest games (see Dechenaux et al.,
2015; Sheremeta 2013). Cason et al. (2013) and Eisenkopf and Teyssier
(2013) provide evidence that overinvestment and overspreading could be
more pronounced in the winner-take-all treatment of our experiment. Then,
the realized payoffs would be lower as compared to the proportional-share
treatments. This may create lower incentives to cooperate in the first place.
Further, the experimental literature provides evidence that subjects less of-
ten choose to enter a winner-take-all contest (Cason et al., 2010). Strategic
alliances are less successful if subjects expect to compete against each other
over an indivisible prize as compared to equally sharing the prize (Ke et
al., 2013), but subjects cooperate strongly if they expect to compete over
a divisible rent (Bayer, 2016). Taken together, the experimental literature
suggests that cooperation is more likely to emerge in SHARE than in LOT-
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TERY. The Alternative Hypothesis is given by:
Alternative Hypothesis. There is less cooperation in LOTTERY than
in SHARE.
4.4.4 PROCEDURE
The experiment was conducted during June 2017 in the Cologne Laboratory
for Economic Research (CLER), University of Cologne, Germany. The
recruitment was organized via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).3 In compliance
with the rules of the CLER, participants received a show-up fee of e4.00.
I conducted two sessions of each of the four treatments. The game was
repeated for 20 periods to account for learning effects. The experiment was
computerized and programmed utilizing the software package zTree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). After their arrival, participants received written instruc-
tions.4 Participants’ beliefs regarding the other player’s contribution in the
cooperation stage, and regarding the other player’s investment in the com-
petition stage were elicited. Belief elicitation was unincentivized and beliefs
were reported simultaneously to participants’ contribution and investment
decisions, respectively.5 Sessions lasted between 50 and 60 minutes. At the
end of the experiment, participants answered a questionnaire.6
After the experiment, points were converted to Euro and paid in cash
with an exchange rate of 250 points against 1.00 Euro plus the show-up
fee of e4.00. On average, participants earned e10.70 in SHARE (min:
e9.50; max: e11.80), e9.90 in LOTTERY (min: e8.20; max: e12.00),
3Participants were excluded who had previously participated in another, related
experiment in which I studied cooperation under the prospect of competing in a Cournot
market with varying degrees of substitution.
4Translated instructions are provided in the Appendix.
5Screenshots are provided in the Appendix.
6Further, they participated in an incentivized risk elicitation task and a distributional
preferences task. These tasks were announced only after the main part of the experiment
ended. I discarded the data since I find significant differences in the distributional
preferences task between SHARE and LOTTERY. These point towards spillover effects
from the main part of the experiment on the two tasks. Hence, the explanatory power
of the elicited measures is questionable in the present study.
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e11.20 in SHARE BASE (min: e10.80; max: e12.00), and e10.90 in LOT-
TERY BASE (min: e7.80; max: e13.70).
I planned to collect 8 independent observations per treatment. Due to
no-shows, I collected 7 independent observations in treatment LOTTERY.
In total, 186 participants participated in the experiment with 59% female
and 41% male. A total of 45% of my sample were students from eco-
nomics, social sciences, and business administration. If not stated other-
wise, statistical comparisons between treatments are based on two-sided
Mann-Whitney U-tests (MWU), and comparisons within treatments are
based on two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (WSR).
4.5 RESULTS
I present the results of the experiment in three steps. In part one, I an-
alyze treatment effects on decision-making in the competition stage (see
Section 4.5.1). In part two, I proceed by the analysis of treatment effects
on decision-making in the cooperation stage (see Section 4.5.2). In part
three, I investigate what drives subjects’ decision to cooperate.
Table 4.1: Aggregated outcomes.
SHARE LOTTERY SHARE BASE LOTTERY BASE
Cooperation stage
Success rate 0.81 (0.09) 0.38 (0.14)
Contribution 43.59 (4.05) 25.40 (6.89)
Belief about other’s contribution 45.10 (3.58) 27.83 (7.07)
Profit cooperation stage 31.41 (4.05) 49.60 (6.89)
Competition stage
Bid 36.70 (1.53) 38.79 (1.80) 35.01 (1.08) 38.86 (1.27)
Belief about other’s bid 40.19 (1.60) 40.20 (1.92) 35.08 (1.54) 40.16 (1.40)
Profit competition stage 63.30 (1.53) 61.21 (1.80) 64.99 (1.08) 61.04 (1.30)
Ind. obs. 8 7 8 8
Notes: The table reports averages and standard errors (in parentheses) of the cooperation stage (upper
part) and the competition stage (lower part) based on independent observations (as reported in the
last row) per treatment.
76
4.5.1 TREATMENT EFFECTS ON COMPETITION
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Figure 4.2: Average investments by given beliefs.
Following Rockenbach and Waligora (2016), I investigate subjects’ av-
erage investments by given beliefs about the competitor’s investment in
Figure 4.2. The solid gray line gives the theoretical best response function,
i.e., the optimal investment for a given belief. The dashed 45◦-line gives
the linear response of a player who equalizes her investment with her belief
about the competitor’s investment. In line with Rockenbach and Walig-
ora (2016), I find that subjects’ decision-making in the competition stage
deviates strongly from the theoretical prediction. Data points are closely
located to the dashed 45◦-line but do not match the course of the theoreti-
cal best response function. In all four treatments, the correlation coefficient
between average investments and average beliefs is positive and significant.7
7Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient based on observations at the matching group
level is equal to 69% (p=0.0580) in SHARE, equal to 86% (p=0.0137) in LOTTERY,
equal to 71% (p=0.0465) in SHARE BASE, and equal to 67% (p=0.0710) in LOT-
TERY BASE.
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An investment that matches the competitor’s expected investment is subop-
timal for any given belief below or above the Nash equilibrium investment.
Below the Nash equilibrium, subjects’ investments are too low if they match
their investment with the competitor’s expected investment. Consequently,
their probability of winning the prize (their share of the prize, respectively)
is inefficiently low. Above the Nash equlibrium, subjects’ average invest-
ments are too high and consequently, they spend too many points given the
marginal (expected) payoff they earn.
On average, subjects expect significantly higher investments by their
competitors in LOTTERY BASE (40.16 points) than in SHARE BASE
(35.08 points, two-sided MWU-test: p=0.0357). No such difference is
observed between SHARE (40.19 points) and LOTTERY (40.20 points,
p=0.8170). In SHARE BASE, subjects expect significantly smaller invest-
ments than in SHARE (p=0.0357). There is no statistically significant
difference between LOTTERY and LOTTERY BASE (p=0.9079).
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Figure 4.3: Average investments (competition stage).
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In Figure 4.3, average investments are given by period. Average in-
vestments are clearly above the Nash equilibrium prediction of 25 points
throughout all periods. I find statistically significant overinvestment in
all four treatments (two-sided WSR-test, SHARE: p=0.0117; LOTTERY:
p=0.0180; SHARE BASE: p=0.0117; LOTTERY BASE: p=0.0117). Av-
erage investments do not differ significantly between SHARE (36.70) and
LOTTERY (38.79, two-sided MWU-test: p=0.4875). However, average
investments are significantly higher in LOTTERY BASE (38.86) than in
SHARE BASE (35.01, p=0.0587).8
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Figure 4.4: Individual payoffs in the competition stage.
Figure 4.4 shows average and individual payoffs in the competition stage.
Average payoffs in the competition stage are 63.30 points in SHARE and
61.21 points in LOTTERY (compare Table 4.1). The difference is not
statistically significant (two-sided MWU-test: p=0.4875). Average pay-
offs are higher in SHARE BASE (64.99) than in LOTTERY BASE (61.04,
8There is no difference in average investments between SHARE and SHARE BASE
(p=0.4008) or between LOTTERY and LOTTERY BASE (p=0.8170).
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p=0.0587). However, there is no statistically significant difference between
SHARE and SHARE BASE (p=0.4008), and also not between LOTTERY
and LOTTERY BASE (p=0.7285). Individual payoffs have a significantly
higher standard deviation in LOTTERY than in SHARE (p=0.0012). With
regard to the two main treatments, the findings of this section are summa-
rized by the following result:
Result 1. In the competition stage, average investments and average
payoffs are not significantly different between SHARE and LOTTERY.
4.5.2 TREATMENT EFFECTS ON COOPERATION
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Figure 4.5: Average success rate by period.
In Figure 4.5, the average success rate is given by period for treatment
SHARE and LOTTERY. Groups cooperate in both treatments, with av-
erage success rates of 81% in SHARE and 38% in LOTTERY (compare
Table 4.1). In period 1, significantly more subjects contribute zero points
in LOTTERY (19.05%) than in SHARE (4.17%, two-sided Fisher’s exact
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test: p=0.041). From Figure 4.5, it can be seen that in SHARE the average
success rate exhibits no significant time trend (Spearman’s rank correla-
tion coefficient: p=0.2351). However, in LOTTERY the average success
rate decays significantly over time (p=0.0000). The average success rate is
significantly higher in SHARE than in LOTTERY (two-sided MWU-test:
p=0.0425).9 This finding is not in line with the Null Hypothesis and sup-
ports the Alternative Hypothesis.
Result 2. In the cooperation stage, the average success rate is signifi-
cantly higher in SHARE than in LOTTERY.
4.5.3 DETERMINANTS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF COOPERATION
Table 4.2 presents the results from a probit regression where the likelihood
to make a cooperative contribution is the dependent variable.10 In line
with Result 2, the regression results show that the winner-take-all mecha-
nism has a significant negative effect on cooperation (compare model (1)).
Further, cooperation decreases significantly over time. If I control for pre-
vious matchings between group members’ contributions in model (2), the
period effect becomes insignificant. As compared to a matching of two co-
operative group members, any other match has a significant negative effect
on cooperation. In line with the strangers matching protocol, the own co-
operativeness in the previous period seems to drive decision-making more
strongly than behavior of the former group member. Hence, in the following
I control for the subject’s own decision to cooperate in the previous period.
In model (3), I study the impact of inequality in outcomes between players.
To this end, a dummy variable is added that is equal to one if the subject’s
period income (the sum of incomes in stage one and two) in period t − 1
was lower than that of her group member. The effect of this variable on
cooperation is negative and significant. However, the treatment effect on
9A histogram of individual contribution choices and a figure of average contributions
by matching group are provided in the Appendix.
10In line with our theoretical predictions, a contribution is classified as cooperative if
it is at least 25 points.
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Table 4.2: Likelihood of a cooperative contribution.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LOTTERY -1.1486** -0.3808** -0.5778* -0.2070
(0=no, 1=yes) (0.51) (0.19) (0.30) (0.32)
period -0.0541*** 0.0017 -0.0142* -0.0233***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Both uncoop. (t-1) -3.9080***
(0=no, 1=yes) (0.38)
Self uncoop. × Other coop. (t-1) -2.3244***
(0=no, 1=yes) (0.22)
Self coop. × Other uncoop. (t-1) -1.3730***
(0=no, 1=yes) (0.20)
Self coop. (t-1) 3.2339*** 3.3223***
(0=no, 1=yes) (0.32) (0.33)
Other earned more (t-1) -0.8090***
(0=no, 1=yes) (0.11)
Own payoff < 75 (t-1) -1.1640***
(0=no, 1=yes) (0.22)
constant 1.7459*** 2.0513*** -0.7285* -0.8710**
(0.31) (0.18) (0.40) (0.38)
Pseudo-R2 0.1694 0.6883 0.6261 0.6414
Number of observations 1,800 1,710 1,710 1,710
Number of cluster 15 15 15 15
Notes: The table reports results from a random effects probit regression. Robust standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered on matching group. *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.
Baseline category (matching): own contribution cooperative × other’s contribution cooperative.
Dependent variable: Cooperative contribution (0 = less than 25 points, 1 = equal to or more
than 25 points).
cooperation remains significant.
Result 3. The experience of being worse off than the other player sig-
nificantly decreases the likelihood of cooperation in the subsequent period,
but cannot explain the treatment effect on cooperation.
Although earning less than the other group member is one of the main
features of the winner-take-all mechanism, it cannot explain the treatment
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effect on cooperation. In model (4), I study the impact of having earned
less than the initial endowment in the cooperation stage. The dummy is
one if the subject earned less than 75 points. The effect of this variable on
cooperation is also negative and significant. Further, the treatment effect
is no longer significant.
Result 4. The experience of earning less than the initial endowment sig-
nificantly decreases the likelihood of cooperation, and can explain the treat-
ment effect of the winner-take-all mechanism on cooperation.
I conclude three things from the analysis: First, the treatment effect
of the winner-take-all mechanism on cooperation cannot be explained by
differences in decision-making or beliefs in the competition stage. Further-
more, average payoffs in the competition stage cannot explain the treatment
effect. However, I find that significantly less subjects cooperate in the first
period of LOTTERY than in the first period of SHARE. Matching pat-
terns can explain the decay of cooperation in LOTTERY. The experience
to earn less than the other player significantly decreases the likelihood of
cooperation. However, this cannot explain the treatment effect on cooper-
ation. The experience of earning less than the initial endowment explains
the treatment effect on cooperation.
4.6 DISCUSSION
In line with the experimental literature, I find significant overinvestment in
all treatments (e.g., see Dechenaux et al., 2015; Sheremeta, 2013). Further-
more, subjects’ decision-making in the competition stage deviates strongly
from the theoretical prediction (see Rockenbach and Waligora, 2016). Av-
erage investments in the competition stage are not significantly different
between the two main treatments SHARE and LOTTERY, but between
SHARE BASE and LOTTERY BASE. The former result is in contrast to
Cason et al. (2013), and Eisenkopf and Teyssier (2013) who find signifi-
cant differences between the two contest forms. However, it is in line with
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Chowdhury et al. (2014), Fallucchi et al. (2013), Shupp et al. (2013), and
Masiliunas et al. (2014) who also find no significant differences between
the proportional-share and the winner-take-all contest under comparable
parameterizations.
In the present study, selection effects could drive decision-making in the
competition stage of SHARE and LOTTERY. If risk-averse, inequity-averse
or loss-averse subjects refrain to cooperate in LOTTERY, this may have an
impact on outcomes in the competition stage. However, in Section 4.5 it
has been shown that average investments are significantly higher in SHARE
than in SHARE BASE while there is no statistically significant difference
between LOTTERY and LOTTERY BASE. If any, one would expect that
selection effects lead to differences in the latter comparison. Behavioral
spillovers from cooperation on competition as observed in Nicklisch (2012)
and Suetens (2008) also cannot explain why there are differences between
the two control treatments, but not between the two main treatments. One
would expect that behavioral spillovers lead to lower investments. However,
investments do not differ between the main and the control treatments.
Overall, the evidence does not point towards systematic distortions due to
selection and spillover effects.
In LOTTERY, average success rates are significantly lower than in
SHARE. This result is in line with Cason et al. (2010) who observe sig-
nificantly more entry in the proportional-share contest than in the winner-
take-all contest. In their experiment, subjects perform a real-effort task
and decide whether they want to enter a contest or be paid by a piece rate.
My findings are also in line with Ke et al. (2013) who find that strategic
alliances are more successful if they do not expect to compete in a lottery
contest. Taken together, the results from the present study and the papers
by Cason et al. (2010) and Ke et al. (2013) point towards an aversion
against participating in winner-take-all contests.
In SHARE, the average success rate of 81% is remarkably high, given
that the return from cooperation is rather low (compare Section 4.4). Cro-
son and Marks (2000) define the step return in threshold public goods games
by the aggregate group payoff from the public good divided by the total con-
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tribution threshold. In the present experiment, the theoretical step return
is given by 150100 = 1.5 in the symmetric cooperative SPNE. Due to over-
investment, the return to cooperation is even lower both in SHARE and
LOTTERY. In groups with a successful group project, the average second
stage payoff is 62 points in SHARE and 64 points in LOTTERY, mean-
ing that the empirical step return is even below 1.25.11 However, subjects
cooperate strongly in SHARE. This is in line with Bayer (2016) who also
observes strong cooperation if returns to cooperation are low. In contrast
to Bayer (2016) who finds that investments are close to the equilibrium pre-
diction, I find significant overinvestment both in SHARE and LOTTERY.
Bayer (2016) attributes his findings to the allocation mechanism in the con-
test. The present experiment sheds doubt on this conclusion, and suggests
that a possible explanation for the findings in Bayer (2016) may be that
the prize increases in contributions.
4.7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, I study whether steep incentives are an impediment to co-
operation. To this end, I set up an experimental game that allows for a
controlled comparison of cooperation under the prospect of competing in a
proportional-share or winner-take-all contest. By the experimental parame-
terization, I ensure that cooperation is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
even if players are risk-averse. I find remarkable differences between the
two games. If players anticipate to compete in the proportional-share con-
test, cooperation is successful in 81% of all cases. If players anticipate
to compete in the winner-take-all contest, the average success rate more
than halves to only 38%. This result cannot be explained by differences in
decision-making in the competition stage. I provide evidence that a signifi-
cant fraction of subjects refrains from cooperation already in the first period
and that matching patterns can explain the strong decay of cooperation in
the winner-take-all treatment which is not observed in the proportional-
11Croson and Marks (2000) observe average success rates of only 63% for a step return
of 3. However, the group size is five in their experiment.
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share treatment. Earning less than the other player has a negative effect
on the willingness to cooperate. However, only earning less than the initial
endowment can explain the treatment effect.
The findings of this study show that indeed steep incentives may be an
impediment to cooperation. Together with the experimental findings that
subjects avoid to enter winner-take-all competition (Cason et al., 2010),
that strategic alliances are less successful if expecting to compete against
each other over an indivisible prize (Ke et al., 2013), and that winner-
take-all competition leads to negative spillovers on cooperation (Buser and
Dreber, 2015; Burks et al., 2009), the present study creates great concern
that we do not underestimate the economic costs of the “winner-take-all
society” (Frank and Cook, 1995) given the cooperation that may not take
place. Steep incentives are ubiquitous in organizations, the job market,
whole industries, and the educational system. In the majority of countries,
we observe huge and growing disparities between the rich and the poor
(Keeley, 2015), leading to differences in chances and economic outcomes.
It is questionable whether living in a society where only a few get very
much is favorable for social cohesion. The results of this study suggest that
steep incentives may lead to an unwillingness to act prosocially in the first
place, and that the experience of not being able to recoup investments into
cooperation may erode prosocial behavior even further. I conclude that
whenever the emergence of cooperation is desirable, we are well-advised to
avoid strong disparities in outcomes.
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4.A THEORETICAL APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Subgame perfect Nash equilibria (standard prefer-
ences)
Proof. Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) prove that under the given as-
sumptions, the stage equilibrium of the competition is unique. Suppose
that a∗1 + a∗2 = T . For any ai < a∗i player i would forgo additional payoff
B + 14V and gain a
∗
i − ai. The maximum gain for the deviating player is
given by B + 14V from contributing ai = 0. This would make her (weakly)
worse off than if she contributes a∗i . For any ai > a∗i player i would forgo
payoff in magnitude of ai − a∗i and would be strictly worse off. Suppose
that a∗1 + a∗2 = 0. For any ai > a∗i player i would forgo payoff in magnitude
of ai since her endowment does not suffice to make the group project suc-
cessful since A < T . Hence, she would be strictly worse off from choosing
ai > a
∗
i .
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4.B EMPIRICAL APPENDIX
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Figure 4.B.1: Distribution of contributions.
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Figure 4.B.2: Average contribution by matching group.
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4.C EXPERIMENTAL APPENDIX
4.C.1 TRANSLATED INSTRUCTIONS
In the following, sample instructions of treatment LOTTERY and
SHARE BASE are given. The instructions are translated from German.
Instructions of LOTTERY
General information
We welcome you to this economic experiment. It is very important that
you read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, please
get in touch with us. Please lift your hand, we will come to you and help
you personally.
For showing up, you receive 4.00 Euro. You can earn additional money
in this experiment depending on your own and the other participants’ de-
cisions. At the end of this experiment, you will receive your payment in
cash.
Please do not talk to the other participants of the experiment. Non-
compliance with this rule leads to exclusion from the experiment and from
all payments.
All decisions are made anonymously, i.e., none of the other participants
gets to know the identity of a participant who made a certain decision. All
payments are made anonymously, too, i.e., no participant gets to know the
payoff of the other participants.
During the experiment your income is initially calculated in points. The
total points your earned during the experiment will be paid out at the end
of the experiment whereby
250 points = 1 Euro.
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On the following pages we explain to you the exact course of the experiment.
Rounds and groups
• The experiment consists of 20 rounds of which each round has the
same structure.
• At the beginning of each round all participants are randomly assigned
into groups of two. This assignment remains unchanged in the
respective round. At the beginning of the next round all participants
are randomly assigned into new groups of two.
Course of one round
Stage 1
• At the beginning of the first stage you and your group member each
receive an endowment A of 75 points.
• You and your group member decide simultaneously how may points
of your endowment A you want to contribute to reach the second
stage.
• Feasible contributions are integer values between 0 and 75 points.
Points that are not contributed are directly added to your round in-
come.
• Your group reaches the second stage of the round if you and your
group member contribute at least 100 points in total. It holds
that:
– If you and your group member contribute less than 100 points in
total, the round finishes after the first stage. Contributed points are
not paid back.
– If you and your group member contribute exactly or more than 100
points, your group reaches the second stage.
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• Your income of the first stage of the round is given by (irrespective
of whether your group has reached the second stage):
Your income in the first stage = 75 - your contributed points
• At the end of the first stage, you and your group member are informed
about the contributed points of both group members and the resulting
incomes in the first stage.
Stage 2 (total group contribution of at least 100 points)
• At the beginning of the second stage you and your group member
each receive an endowment B of 50 points.
• In the second stage you and your group members can receive a prize
of 100 points.
• You and your group member simultaneously decide how many points
of your endowment B to invest to increase the probability with
which you receive the prize.
• Feasible investments are integer values between 0 and 50 points. Points
that are not invested are added to your round income.
• The probability with which you receive the prize depends on how
many points you invested and how many points your group member
invested. The following rule applies:
Probability with which you receive the prize =
Points you invested
Sum of points you and your group member invested
For you and your group member it holds that:
- The probability with which you receive the prize is equal to the num-
ber of points you invested divided by the sum of all points invested
(by you and your group member).
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- The probability with which you receive the prize is at least 0% and
at most 100%.
- Each point you yourself invest increases the probability with which
you receive the prize.
- Each point your group member invests reduces the probability with
which you receive the prize.
It further holds that:
- If no member of your group invested points, no one receives the
prize.
- If only one member of your group invested points, it receives the
prize for certain.
• Your income of the second stage of the round is given by:
Your income in the second stage if you receive the prize =
50 - your invested points + 100
Your income in the second stage if you do not receive the prize =
50 - your invested points
• At the end of the second stage, you and your group member are
informed about:
– the points invested by you and your group member
– the probabilities with which you and your group member receive
the prize, respectively
– which member of your group receives the prize
– the resulting incomes of the second stage of both group members.
At the end of the round, you and your group member are informed about
the round incomes (income of the first stage + income of the second stage
if the second stage is reached) of both group members.
In the experiment, you receive the opportunity to use a calculator in the
second stage. You can enter hypothetical values for the points invested by
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you and your group member. The calculator determines the hypothetical
probability with which you receive the prize as well as the hypothetical
probability with which your group member receives the prize. The calcula-
tor is available in the second stage of each round.
Income of the experiment
Your income of the experiment is the sum of the round incomes of all 20
rounds.
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Instructions of SHARE BASE
General information
We welcome you to this economic experiment. It is very important that
you read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, please
get in touch with us. Please lift your hand, we will come to you and help
you personally.
For showing up, you receive 4.00 Euro. You can earn additional money
in this experiment depending on your own and the other participants’ de-
cisions. At the end of this experiment, you will receive your payment in
cash.
Please do not talk to the other participants of the experiment. Non-
compliance with this rule leads to exclusion from the experiment and from
all payments.
All decisions are made anonymously, i.e., none of the other participants
gets to know the identity of a participant who made a certain decision. All
payments are made anonymously, too, i.e., no participant gets to know the
payoff of the other participants.
During the experiment your income is initially calculated in points. The
total points your earned during the experiment will be paid out at the end
of the experiment whereby
250 points = 1 Euro.
You receive an initial endowment of 500 points. On the following pages we
explain to you the exact course of the experiment.
Rounds and groups
• The experiment consists of 20 rounds of which each round has the
same structure.
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• At the beginning of each round all participants are randomly assigned
into groups of two. This assignment remains unchanged in the
respective round. At the beginning of the next round all participants
are randomly assigned into new groups of two.
Course of one round
• At the beginning of the round you and your group member each re-
ceive an endowment of 50 points.
• You and your group members can receive a share of a prize of 100
points.
• You and your group member simultaneously decide how many points
of your endowment to invest to increase the share you receive of
the prize.
• Feasible investments are integer values between 0 and 50 points. Points
that are not invested are added to your round income.
• The share you receive of the prize depends on how many points you
invested and how many points your group member invested. The
following rule applies:
Share of the prize you receive = Points you investedSum of points you and your group member invested
For you and your group member it holds that:
- The share you receive of the prize is equal to the number of points
you invested divided by the sum of all points invested (by you and
your group member).
- The share you receive of the prize is at least 0 and at most 100 points.
- Each point you yourself invest increases the share you receive of the
prize.
- Each point your group member invests reduces the share you receive
of the prize.
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It further holds that:
- If no member of your group invested points, no one receives the
prize.
- If only one member of your group invested points, it receives the
whole prize.
• Your round income is given by:
Your round income =
50 - your invested points + your share of the prize × 100
• At the end of the round, you and your group member are informed
about:
– the points invested by you and your group member
– the shares you and your group member receive of the prize, re-
spectively
– the resulting round incomes of both group members.
In the experiment, you receive the opportunity to use a calculator. You
can enter hypothetical values for the points invested by you and your group
member. The calculator determines the hypothetical share you receive of
the prize as well as the hypothetical share your group member receives of
the prize. The calculator is available in each round.
Income of the experiment
Your income of the experiment is the sum of the round incomes of all 20
rounds.
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4.C.2 SCREENSHOTS
Figure 4.C.1: Screenshot cooperation stage.
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Figure 4.C.2: Screenshot competition stage.
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chapter 5
CROWDING-IN SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION UNDER
VARYING OPPORTUNITY COSTS
Abstract
Consumption frequently imposes negative externalities on the
environment. Feedback helps to induce resource conservation. How-
ever, little is known about how feedback affects behavior under vary-
ing individual opportunity costs (e.g., using public transport instead
of driving by car may be less convenient on the countryside than
in the city). In a laboratory experiment, we study real-resource
consumption under varying opportunity costs. Subjects face a te-
dious real-effort task which can be simplified, but this leads to a real
waste and a blank sheet of paper is shredded. Our results show that
feedback provision affects decision-making differently depending on
opportunity costs.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Promoting sustainable consumption is challenging. Frequently, individual
consumption is socially costly due to negative externalities on the environ-
ment. The problem is that these costs may seem negligible if the benefits
from consumption are immediate and more perceptible. For example, the
negative impact of increased CO2 emissions on the climate may not seem
important the moment you decide to cover a distance by car and not by pub-
lic transport. The negative impact of plastic waste on the environment may
not seem important the moment you decide to buy a coffee to go. Sustain-
able consumption is the perfect example of a social dilemma: The individual
has to trade off personal convenience with the objective of environmental
conservation. A narrow view only captures current individual benefits and
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individual costs while a broader view accounts for the overall consequences
of consumption, i.e., for negative externalities on the environment. Then,
even if the individual has a preference to protect the environment, she may
not live up to her ideals since her decision-making is biased towards the
salient individual costs and benefits (Bordalo et al., 2012; Kahneman et al.,
1982). This phenomenon is referred to as salience bias (Tiefenbeck et al.,
2016). Hence, it is not the objective situation which determines behavior,
but the subjective construal of the situation. To achieve behavioral change,
mechanisms need to affect information processing (Crusius et al., 2012).
Recent field interventions aim to achieve behavioral change by differ-
ent forms of feedback provision.1 While these studies illustrate when and
how feedback has an impact on resource consumption, only little is known
about how feedback interacts with individual costs of behavioral change. In
the field, it is difficult to control for these individual opportunity costs of
resource conservation since typically, only baseline consumption and con-
sumption after a treatment intervention are observable. It is clear, however,
that attitudes towards resource conservation strongly vary with the neces-
sity to consume. It may be rational for an individual to forgo comfort if
there are convenient alternatives (e.g., not driving a car when living in a
city with extensive public transport), but it may be too costly for her if
convenient alternatives are not available (e.g., not driving a car when liv-
ing on the countryside with sporadic public transport). Then, the costs of
changing behavior may be too high to engage in resource conservation. As
a consequence, we cannot derive final conclusions from the existing body of
literature on how feedback provision affects decision-making under varying
opportunity costs.
In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature by an examination
of the impact of different feedback regimes on resource consumption in a
laboratory environment where we can control and systematically vary the
opportunity costs of resource conservation. We manipulate individual feed-
back on past resource consumption to influence resource conservation. We
apply a novel experimental design to induce negative externalities in the
1See reviews by Abrahamse et al. (2005), Shippee (1980), Winett and Neale (1979).
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laboratory. Subjects face a tedious real-effort task which they can simplify
by using a shortcut. However, each time a shortcut is used, a blank sheet of
paper is shredded. We thus create a situation in which the individual needs
to forgo convenience (i.e., exert more effort) to save resources. We vary the
salience of resource wasting across treatments. In the first condition, we
provide feedback on accumulated resource wasting and constantly confront
subjects with a live video stream of their total accumulated paper waste. In
the second condition, the paper waste is hidden within the shredding bin,
making it harder for the subject to grasp the total extent of her resource
waste. Because, as discussed above, the reaction to feedback may vary with
the necessity to consume, we vary the opportunity costs of resource conser-
vation by manipulating the time available to solve the real-effort tasks. In
one condition, the time limit is sufficient to solve all tasks without using
shortcuts, i.e., shortcuts may be used only for convenience. In the other
condition, the time limit is reduced severely making it impossible to solve
all tasks without using shortcuts, i.e., shortcuts need to be used to secure
the maximum payoff. This setup allows us to study the interplay of feed-
back and opportunity costs on real consumption decisions. Further, we set
up two baseline treatments in which we only vary the time limit but where
the use of shortcuts does not exhibit negative externalities.
Our results show that the effect of feedback indeed differs with the
opportunity costs of resource conservation. If there is a negative externality,
subjects use substantially fewer shortcuts in both time conditions. Subjects
substitute shortcuts by increasing their own effort to avoid resource wasting.
If necessary, they even give up part of their payoff to save resources. As
long as the opportunity costs are low and resources are used for individual
convenience only, feedback on accumulated resource wasting does not reduce
the use of resources. However, if participants have to use the shortcut to
avoid monetary losses, feedback on accumulated resource wasting decreases
resource consumption.
Our study shows that feedback mechanisms need to focus on the inter-
play of information provision and economic incentives. Specifically, studies
that intervene in individual resource consumption need to carefully take
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into account the opportunity costs associated with the intervention. In
contrast to our laboratory setting in which opportunity costs cannot be
externalized and have to be incurred by the subject (i.e., she has to “pay”
for the conservation of resources through a lower monetary payoff), such an
externalization may well be the case in the field. Opportunity costs and
thus the efficacy of interventions are highly context-dependent and should
thus be a cornerstone of any intervention design.
5.2 RELATED LITERATURE
Two fields of literature are especially relevant with regard to the present
study. First, we review existing feedback interventions in the field and
discuss the feedback mechanism proposed by this paper. Second, we review
laboratory experiments which induce negative externalities and discuss our
design choices. The question whether behavioral interventions can induce
sustainable decision-making has a long tradition in economics and related
fields (for a review, see Abrahamse et al., 2005; Shippee, 1980; Winett
and Neale, 1979). In contrast to standard economic theory which assumes
that decision-makers hold all the information necessary to make an optimal
consumption choice, this literature assumes that the cost-benefit calculus
is potentially biased due to a lack of information. Indeed, several studies
provide evidence that consumption of resources like energy and water can
be decreased by feedback interventions. In what follows, we focus on the
behavioral dimension of feedback.
Early feedback interventions are based on so-called home reports. In
these studies, feedback is provided on a regular basis, but focuses on past
decision-making only. The results show that home energy reports can
decrease household energy consumption by 2% (e.g., Allcott and Mul-
lainathan, 2010; Costa and Kahn, 2013; Allcott and Rogers, 2014). Similar
interventions for water consumption yield effects between 0% and 5% (Fer-
raro and Price, 2013; Mitchell and Chesnutt, 2013; Bernedo et al., 2014;
Schultz et al., 2016; Brent et al. 2015). The rapid technological advance-
ments in recent years allow for the provision of more timely feedback. In
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more recent feedback intervention studies, so-called smart meters are in-
stalled to provide timely feedback on aggregate resource consumption, e.g.,
via home displays or web applications. However, although participants can
monitor their resource consumption on a more frequent basis, electricity
consumption decreases by only 2% to 5% in these smart-metering stud-
ies (Degen et al. 2013, McKerracher and Torriti 2013, Buchanan et al.
2015). A recent study by Tiefenbeck et al. (2016) suggests that these
rather moderate effects may be driven by the fact that feedback in all the
former interventions only allows for the adaption of future behavior. In
the authors’ view, the segregation of feedback and consumption may make
adaption prone to relapse. In their study, Tiefenbeck et al. (2016) provide
real-time feedback on current consumption that allows for the immediate
adaption of behavior. A smart meter is installed in participants’ showers
that measures water and energy consumption while subjects take a shower.
The authors show that using this feedback mechanism decreases electricity
and water consumption by 22%.
Shortcut Slidertask
Feed-
back
Figure 5.1: Timing in the experiment.
In this study, we vary feedback to determine its impact on decision-
making under varying opportunity costs of resource consumption. In a
laboratory experiment, subjects face a repeated individual decision task.
In Figure 5.1, the sequence of one period is given. First, subjects determine
the number of shortcuts they want to use. Then, they have to perform
the slider task. Last, they receive feedback on resource wasting. Then, the
sequence starts again. In one condition, feedback is provided only on the
current period’s waste of resources. Following the notion by Read et al.
(1999) that people frequently fail to account for the overall consequences of
their decision-making, we design a feedback mechanism that provides sub-
jects with feedback on accumulated resource wasting. Thus, in the other
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condition, feedback is provided on the current plus all previous periods.
As in Tiefenbeck et al. (2016), both feedback mechanisms of our experi-
ment allow for the immediate adaption of behavior, as the decision to use
shortcuts in the subsequent period immediately follows the feedback stage.
There is a growing literature which examines decision-making when it
imposes negative externalities in laboratory or lab in the field settings. Falk
and Szech (2013) experimentally study decision-making where the decision
to accept an offer of 10 Euro leads to the death of a mouse. The authors’
focus is on whether market interaction erodes moral behavior. The focus
of the present study is different. We study decision-making over time and
hypothesize that subjects’ fail to account for the overall consequences of
their decision-making. Further, since our focus is on negative externalities
on the environment, the mouse-paradigm obviously is not suitable for the
present study. Bartling et al. (2015) induce negative externalities in a lab-
oratory experiment where the production of an “unfair product” exhibits
zero costs, but exhibits a negative externality on a passive third party. In
their experiment, the externality is implemented by a payoff reduction on
behalf of a passive subject. Although this paradigm would allow us to
study decision-making over time, for two reasons it is also not suitable for
the present study. First, we aim to abstract from fairness concerns that
may arise if negative externalities were imposed on a third party. Second,
we focus on individual decision-making and thus abstract from peer effects.
These would arise if a third party was involved. A third paradigm is intro-
duced in Kirchler et al. (2016). Here, subjects can choose to take money,
or donate a potentially larger sum to UNICEF for measles vaccines. In the
experiment, taking money imposes a negative externality as the donation
to UNICEF is decreased. Another related paradigm is used by Irlenbusch
and Saxler (2015). In their study, a subject’s decision to take money im-
plements a negative externality as a default donation to a charity which
sponsors warm meals for children is decreased. Alike in Bartling et al.
(2015), the choice to generate a negative externality may also be guided
by other-regarding concerns in Kirchler et al. (2016) and Irlenbusch and
Saxler (2015). Hence, we opt for a different design. A fourth, more closely
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related paradigm is introduced by Lo¨schel et al. (2017). In a framed field
experiment, the authors elicit the demand for voluntary climate change
mitigation and provide participants with the opportunity to buy European
Union Allowances which are withdrawn from the European Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme. In the present study, we could induce a negative externality
by reducing a given amount of permits. However, in this situation subjects
would only influence how much other individuals can emit. We opt for a
more direct link between decision-making and resource wasting. In another
related laboratory experiment by Bu¨hren and Daskalakis (2015), subjects
are asked to imagine putting effort into energy saving activities. Like in our
experiment, two treatments induce an actual waste of resources. Terrace
heaters are installed outside the laboratory. The more slider tasks subjects
solve, the earlier the heater is switched off.
The study of negative externalities in laboratory environments has the
advantage that it allows to systematically vary parameters that are exoge-
nous and sometimes unobservable in the field. Laboratory experiments can
thus provide complementary evidence informing the design and conduct of
field interventions. However, it almost always creates an artificial link be-
tween the own decision and the imposed consequences on third parties. To
control for potentially arising experimenter demand effects, it is necessary
to hold potential confounds constant across treatments. To control for po-
tentially arising experimenter demand effects, we do not install a default
waste of resources, but let subjects actively engage in resource consumption.
Within this setting, we examine how feedback affects behavior. The overall
consequences of decision-making are the same in the resulting treatment
comparisons, and this is known to subjects. By these design features, we
aim to minimize potential confounds.
5.3 THE EXPERIMENT
The experiment consists of an individual decision task that is repeated for 50
periods over six treatments in a between-subjects design. Throughout the
experiment, we abstract from peer effects, i.e., subjects do not interact with
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each other and no subject is informed about the other subjects’ decisions
or payoffs.
5.3.1 COURSE OF ONE PERIOD
In each period, subjects perform a real-effort task that consists of ten ran-
domly positioned sliders which have to be positioned correctly to generate
income (Gill and Prowse, 2012). Sliders can be moved to any integer be-
tween 0 and 100 inclusive. The slider has to be correctly positioned at
position 50.2 Each correctly positioned slider increases the subject’s period
income by e0.04. The task can be simplified by the use of shortcuts. The
subject decides at the beginning of each period how many shortcuts she
wants to use, i.e., how many sliders she wants to simplify. Every shortcut
simplifies one slider. Whenever a subject uses a shortcut on a slider, the
number of possible positions is reduced to three (0, 50, and 100). This
makes it trivial to complete the task, i.e., to correctly position the slider at
position 50. Hence, the use of shortcuts decreases individual effort costs.
Each of the 50 identical periods has the following three stages:
1) Shortcuts. Subjects decide how many shortcuts to use to simplify
sliders in the subsequent stage.
2) Slider task. Subjects have to correctly position 10 sliders and earn
money for every correctly positioned slider.
3) Feedback. Subjects are provided with individual feedback on the neg-
ative externality imposed by their individual use of shortcuts.
The use of shortcuts imposes a negative externality. Whenever the sub-
ject uses a shortcut to simplify a slider, a blank (i.e., unused) sheet of paper
is destroyed in a shredder. This is explicitly stated in the instructions. At
the beginning of each period, subjects are asked how many sliders they
want to simplify in the respective period (i.e., they have to enter an inte-
ger value x between 0 and 10). According to their choice of shortcuts, the
2The experiment is programmed such that the slider is never positioned at position
50 initially.
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first x sliders on the subject’s screen are simplified.3 After the slider-task
stage, the shredding of the paper takes place in a separate room. Subjects
observe the shredding process via a live video stream. Each participant has
a separate shredder and an individual webcam to avoid peer effects. The
machinery noise is inaudible in the participants’ room. At the beginning of
the experiment, subjects verify that the stream is live by writing a symbol
and their cabin number on a Post-It note. This personalized Post-It note
is then attached to their individual shredder.
5.3.2 TREATMENTS
To address our research question, we set up four treatments in a 2×2-
design. Additionally, we run two baseline treatments. Table 5.1 shows all
six treatments. The experimental treatments vary the opportunity costs
of resource conservation by different time limits to solve a given set of ten
slider tasks (40 seconds vs. 75 seconds). Further, treatments vary the
feedback provided to subjects about their current and accumulated cause
of negative externalities (closed vs. open shredder bin).
Table 5.1: Treatments.
Feedback
Baseline
closed bin open bin
Time limit
75 seconds CLOSED75 OPEN75 NOEXT75
40 seconds CLOSED40 OPEN40 NOEXT40
Time Limit. The first treatment variable is the time limit of the real-
effort task to induce different opportunity costs of resource conservation.
In line with Doerrenberg et al. (2015), we estimate that subjects should be
able to solve all ten sliders within 75 seconds. Thus, there is no monetary
incentive to use shortcuts and the opportunity cost of resource conservation
is low. If, however, the time limit is set to 40 seconds, the opportunity cost
3Screenshots and translated instructions are provided in the Appendix.
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of resource conservation is much higher, and there is a strong incentive to
use shortcuts.
Feedback. The second treatment variable is feedback on resource con-
sumption. Prior to the experiment, we cut open one side of the shredder
bin. To provide accumulated feedback on resource wasting, the open side of
the shredder bin is oriented towards the camera, meaning that the shredded
paper is visible to subjects as it falls out the shredding bin.4 Hence, in the
OPEN setup, subjects can observe the total accumulated consequences of
their current and past choices to use shortcuts. In the CLOSED setup, we
provide feedback on current resource wasting only. Here, the closed side of
the shredder bin is oriented towards the camera, i.e., only the process of
shredding can be observed but the total paper waste stays hidden within the
shredder bin. In other words, subjects can only observe the consequences
of their current choice to use shortcuts.
Baseline. In addition to the four main treatments, we run two addi-
tional baseline treatments without negative externalities. That is, we run
the same real-effort task over 50 periods and vary the time limit (40 seconds
vs. 75 seconds) but the use of shortcuts does not lead to the shredding of
paper. The two baseline treatments allow us to study decision-making in a
situation in which the negative externality does not exist. We refer to these
baseline treatments as NOEXT75 and NOEXT40.
Crossing. We cross the two main treatment variables in a fully factorial
2×2 design. The two baseline treatments only vary the time limit but do
not impose a negative externality.
5.3.3 HYPOTHESES
This section presents a simple decision problem to formally guide our argu-
mentation. The two variables that determine the economic environment are
the time limit τ ∈ R that specifies how long a period lasts and the feedback
parameter φ ∈ R that specifies how much information the decision-maker
has about accumulated resource wasting. That is, φt is the information
4Pictures are provided in the Appendix.
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provided on the number of shortcuts used in the past periods up to current
period t. In each period t, the decision-maker chooses her real effort et and
the number of shortcuts st. The per-period utility function reads as:
Ut(et, st; τ, φ) = u(et)− c(et, st)− d(st; τ, φ).
u is the direct utility from money and is increasing and concave in the
provided effort et. We model two cost functions to account for the cost from
real effort (c) and the cost from perceived environmental damage (d). We
assume that the physical real-effort costs c(et, st) do not directly depend on
the time limit τ and the feedback φ, i.e., solving a slider is equally difficult
under varying time limits, and also under varying feedback. However, τ
and φ influence the real-effort costs indirectly since both variables have
an impact on the perceived environmental costs d(st; τ, φ), and thus affect
an individual’s decision how many shortcuts to use. The real-effort cost
function c is increasing and convex in effort, and decreasing and convex
in the number of shortcuts. This means that shortcuts lighten the burden
from real effort. The perceived environmental cost function d is increasing
and convex in the number of used shortcuts (and thus shredded sheets of
paper).
In the experiment, under feedback condition OPEN, the decision-maker
observes the total amount of shredded paper up until (and including) the
current period t. Hence, she has the information set
ΦOPENt = {s1, s2, ..., st−1, st}.
This information set is contained in the feedback φOPEN = ∑tj=1 sj. On
the contrary, under feedback condition CLOSED, the decision-maker does
only observe the amount of shredded paper in the current period t and has
information set
ΦCLOSEDt = {st}.
This information set is contained in the feedback φCLOSED = st. Thus,
ΦCLOSEDt ∈ ΦOPENt and therefore φCLOSED < φOPEN , i.e., the decision-
maker considers less information under CLOSED than under OPEN feed-
back. We derive our predictions for the experiment by totally differentiating
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the first-order conditions of the per-period utility function.5 With regard
to the provided feedback, we expect that the number of used shortcuts de-
creases if more feedback is provided, i.e., ds
dφ
< 0.
Hypothesis 1. The number of shortcuts decreases in provided feedback.
With regard to the available time, we expect that the number of used short-
cuts decreases if the time limit is higher, i.e., ds
dτ
< 0.
Hypothesis 2. The number of shortcuts decreases if more time is available.
With regard to the interaction between the feedback and the time limit, we
expect that the effect of feedback on the use of shortcuts is stronger if less
time is available, i.e., ds
dτdφ
< 0.
Hypothesis 3. The number of shortcuts decreases stronger in the provided
feedback if less time is available.
5.3.4 PROCEDURE
The experiment was conducted in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic
Research (CLER) at the University of Cologne, Germany. The recruitment
was organized via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). A total of 175 participants par-
ticipated in the experiment with 55% female and 45% male. A total of 45%
of our sample were students from economics, social sciences, and business
administration. Neither the content of the experiment nor expected payoffs
were stated in the invitation email. In compliance with the rules of the
CLER, participants received a show-up fee of e4.00.
The experiment took place in two separate rooms. This enabled us to
install the shredders in the second room and to set up a constant real-time
video stream via webcam to the other room. We intentionally avoided to
install the shredders in the same room where the participants were seated
5See Appendix for the derivation of the hypotheses.
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to abstract from peer effects and to ensure the safety of participants. The
machinery noise was inaudible in the participants’ room. The experiment
was programmed utilizing the software package zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).
We conducted nine sessions of the four main treatments with four par-
ticipants each to ensure the correct implementation of the experiment. The
control treatments (NOEXT40 and NOEXT75) were conducted in one ses-
sion each. Here, no shredders were needed. This enabled us to run sessions
with a higher number of participants. Two research assistants operated the
shredders in the second room. The instructions clearly stated that partic-
ipants were not recorded via webcam, and webcams on the participants’
desktops were covered with tape.
All instructions were provided on screen.6 The picture of the shredder
was streamed on the right half of participants’ desktops from the begin-
ning of the session. To ensure credibility of the shredding operation, we let
participants mark a Post-It note with their cubicle number and an individ-
ual drawing at the beginning of the experiment.7 The Post-It notes were
collected and put on the shredder assigned to the participant before the
main part of the experiment began. To ensure that the slider task could
be performed without distractions, we asked participants to turn off their
mobile phones and other electronic devices, and to put them in an enve-
lope that would stay within the participant’s cubicle throughout the entire
experiment.
To make participants familiar with the slider task, two incentivized prac-
tice periods were run prior to the main 50 periods of the experiment. In the
first practice period, participants had to position ten non-simplified sliders,
and in the second period, they had to do the same for ten simplified sliders.
In both practice periods, each solved slider generated a payoff of e0.04, i.e.,
incentives were the same in the practice and main periods. Only after the
two practice periods, the on-screen instructions made participants familiar
with the use of shortcuts and the negative externality imposed.
6Translated instructions are provided in the Appendix.
7Pictures of the experimental setup are provided in the Appendix.
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After the 50 main periods, participants were asked whether they wanted
to learn the total number of blank sheets of paper that were shredded due
to their choices in the experiment. After that, participants were asked to
guess the number of paper sheets that were shredded due to their use of
shortcuts. On the next screen, participants were informed about their total
number of correctly positioned sliders and their individual payoff that was
the sum of period incomes from all 50 periods and the two practice periods
of the experiment. Depending on their revelation choice, information about
the total number of blank sheets of paper was also provided. After this
summary, participants were given the opportunity to donate to the World
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) for the conservation of the Amazonian for-
est. The donation decision was not announced in any previous period or
the instructions. In total, e154.87 were donated to the WWF. Participants
were asked to fill out a short questionnaire asking for demographics and par-
ticipants’ perceptions and considerations during the experiment. Overall,
28,805 blank sheets of paper were shredded.
On average, participants earned e24.20 in NOEXT75 (min: e22.00;
max: e24.80), e23.80 in CLOSED75 (min: e19.00; max: e24.80), e23.30
in OPEN75 (min: e19.00; max: e24.80), e23.20 in NOEXT40 (min:
e14.00; max: e24.70), e19.20 in CLOSED40 (min: e9.00; max: e24.60),
and e18.60 in OPEN40 (min: e4.00; max: e24.60). We collected between
35 and 36 independent observations for each of the four main treatments,
and 16 independent observations for each of the two control treatments. By
focusing on individual decisions and not providing feedback about other par-
ticipants’ decisions, we ensured statistical independence across observations
on the participant level. If not stated otherwise, statistical comparisons be-
tween treatments are based on two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests (MWU),
and comparisons within treatments are based on two-sided Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests (WSR).
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5.4 RESULTS
We present our experimental results in three steps. In part one, we analyze
how the different levels of information on resource wasting affect the con-
sumption of resources (i.e., the number of used shortcuts) and individual
effort (i.e., the number of solved sliders) when opportunity costs are low
(i.e., the time limit is 75 seconds). In part two, we investigate trade-offs
between individual benefits and resource conservation when opportunity
costs are high (i.e., the time limit is 40 seconds). In part three, we analyze
how our feedback mechanism on accumulated resource wasting influences
decision-making. Table 5.1 provides the summary statistics of the main
variables across treatments.
Table 5.1: Aggregated outcomes.
NOEXT75 CLOSED75 OPEN75 NOEXT40 CLOSED40 OPEN40
Solved sliders
499.88 488.53 483.50 494.06 406.83 368.91
(0.09) (2.71) (3.56) (2.29) (14.92) (17.96)
% of NOEXT 97.73% 96.72% 82.34% 74.67%
Used shortcuts
243.31 86.89 91.50 357.94 211.14 147.49
(50.99) (20.12) (26.48) (29.78) (29.72) (26.91)
% of NOEXT 35.71% 37.61% 58.99% 41.20%
Payoff (in e)
20.00 19.54 19.34 19.76 16.27 14.76
(0.00) (0.11) (0.14) (0.09) (0.60) (0.72)
Independent obs. 16 36 36 16 36 35
Notes: The table reports averages and standard errors (in parentheses) based on independent ob-
servations per treatment. Percentages of NOEXT are calculated by using the average of individual
totals relative to the average total in NOEXT in the respective time condition (note that relative
payoffs equal relative solved sliders).
5.4.1 THE EFFECT OF THE NEGATIVE EXTERNALITY
We begin our analysis by examining the baseline treatment NOEXT75
where the use of shortcuts does not impose any externalities, and the time
limit is 75 seconds. Under the assumption that solving the sliders exhibits
effort costs, standard theory would predict that participants use any short-
cut available to minimize these effort costs and to be able to solve all 500
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sliders. Indeed, on average subjects solve almost all sliders in NOEXT75
(499.88, compare Table 5.1). The shortcut is used for 243.31 of 500 sliders
on average, i.e., even if there is no negative externality subjects substitute
almost 50% of shortcuts by own effort.
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Figure 5.2: Used shortcuts and solved sliders.
As shown in Figure 5.2, subjects substitute shortcuts by own effort even
more when the shortcut imposes a negative externality.8 In CLOSED75, the
average number of solved sliders (488.53) is still close to 500 sliders. How-
ever, the average number of used shortcuts drops by 64% to 86.89. Although
both solved sliders and used shortcuts are significantly lower in CLOSED75
than in NOEXT75 (two-sided MWU-test: solved sliders: p=0.0000; used
shortcuts: p=0.0055), there is a remarkable difference which becomes clear
when looking at the relative changes. In CLOSED75, subjects on aver-
age solve 98% of the sliders solved in NOEXT75. At the same time, they
use only 36% of the shortcuts. The reduction of used shortcuts is signif-
icantly higher than the reduction of solved sliders (two-sided WSR-test:
8A figure of the use of shortcuts and solved sliders by period is provided in the
Appendix.
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p=0.0000), meaning that subjects substitute considerable amounts of re-
source consumption by own effort when there is a negative externality.9 We
observe similar patterns when subjects are provided with feedback on ac-
cumulated resource wasting in OPEN75. On average, subjects solve 97%
of the sliders that are solved in NOEXT75, but use only 38% of the short-
cuts. The difference between both relative measures is again significant
(two-sided WSR-test: p=0.0008). Thus, both in CLOSED75 and OPEN75,
the negative externality leads subjects to substitute resource consumption
by own effort.
The above analysis reveals that subjects react similarly to the imposi-
tion of a negative externality in CLOSED75 and OPEN75, i.e., irrespec-
tive of the feedback on accumulated resource wasting. The comparison
of CLOSED75 and OPEN75 reveals that confronting participants with the
overall consequences of their choices does not affect their decisions to use the
shortcuts. Neither the average number of solved sliders (two-sided MWU-
test: p=0.3125) nor the number of used shortcuts (p=0.8593) is statistically
different between CLOSED75 and OPEN75. This means that if subjects
mainly consume for convenience (because there is no time pressure), feed-
back on accumulated resource wasting does not affect decision-making. This
finding does not support Hypothesis 1.
Result 1. When opportunity costs of resource conservation are low,
feedback on accumulated resource wasting does not have a statistically sig-
nificant effect on resource consumption.
One possible explanation for this result could be that resources are
mainly consumed for convenience in this setting. The time limit of 75 sec-
onds is sufficient to solve all sliders without using shortcuts. In fact, 31% of
9To test this difference in differences, we first calculate the difference in solved sliders
by deducting each subject’s individual number of solved sliders in CLOSED75 from the
average number of solved sliders in NOEXT75. Then, we calculate the difference in
used shortcuts by deducting each subject’s individual number of used shortcuts from
the average number of used shortcuts in NOEXT75. The resulting differences are then
compared using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
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the subjects in CLOSED75 and OPEN75 do not use a single shortcut and
still manage to solve a total of 485 sliders on average (in comparison, only
13% of the subjects in NOEXT75 do not use any shortcut and solve 500 slid-
ers on average). It seems that subjects already only use as many shortcuts
as necessary to solve all sliders when their use of shortcuts imposes a nega-
tive externality in CLOSED75. The trade-off between individual monetary
benefits and resource conservation is rather weak under the time limit of
75 seconds, meaning that there may be no room for further improvements.
In the following section, we analyze whether this result changes under the
tighter time limit of 40 seconds.
5.4.2 OPPORTUNITY COSTS AND RESOURCE CONSERVATION
First, we check the effectiveness of the time manipulation by comparing the
average number of solved sliders in the practice period where no shortcuts
are available. While on average subjects solve 7.65 out of 10 sliders within 75
seconds (NOEXT75, CLOSED75 and OPEN75), they only solve 4.01 out of
10 sliders within 40 seconds (NOEXT40, CLOSED40 and OPEN40). Hence,
by our time manipulation, we reduced subjects’ capability to solve the 10
sliders by mere effort provision by roughly one half, thereby increasing the
opportunity costs of resource conservation. In the following, we investigate
the induced trade-off between individual monetary benefits and resource
conservation.
As expected, we see from Figure 5.2 that when there is no negative
externality, a reduction of time from 75 to 40 seconds leads to a higher
average number of used shortcuts of 357.94 in NOEXT40 as compared to
243.31 in NOEXT75 (p=0.0882). The reduced time limit has a similar ef-
fect when the use of shortcuts imposes a negative externality. Here, the
average number of used shortcuts is 211.14 in CLOSED40 as compared to
86.89 in CLOSED75 (p=0.0024). This result is in line with Hypothesis 2.
Result 2. A stricter time limit leads subjects to use significantly more
shortcuts.
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Turning to the impact of feedback on resource consumption in the high
opportunity costs treatments, we find the following: In comparison to
NOEXT40, the imposition of a negative externality already leads to signifi-
cantly less resource consumption in CLOSED40 (p=0.0087). Furthermore,
the provision of feedback on accumulated waste leads to an even lower level
of used shortcuts in OPEN40 as compared to CLOSED40 (p=0.0708). In
relative terms, subjects consume 41% less in CLOSED40 than in NOEXT40.
Feedback on accumulated consequences leads subjects to consume 59% less
in OPEN40 than in NOEXT40. Thus, feedback on accumulated resource
wasting indeed affects decision-making differently under varying opportu-
nity costs. The result is in line with Hypothesis 3.
Result 3. When opportunity costs of resource conservation are high,
feedback on accumulated resource wasting significantly decreases the use of
shortcuts.
Under high opportunity costs, we observe that the average number of
solved sliders is only 368.91 in OPEN40 as compared to 406.83 in CLOSED40
and to 494.06 in NOEXT40. In consequence, on average subjects earn e5.00
less in OPEN40 than in NOEXT40, which equals more than 20% of the po-
tential earnings in this experiment. Indeed, payoffs are significantly lower
both in OPEN40 and CLOSED40 than in NOEXT40 (p=0.0000 in both
comparisons), but also between these two treatments (p=0.0794). In com-
parison, no such difference is observed between CLOSED75 and OPEN75
(p=0.3125). This means that when opportunity costs of resource conserva-
tion are high, subjects substitute shortcuts by own effort and even by own
payoff.
5.4.3 GENERAL AVOIDANCE OR EXPERIENCE
Recall from Section 5.3 that feedback on accumulated resource consumption
should have an effect on decision-making only after the subject actually used
shortcuts in any of the previous periods. However, it could also be that the
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picture of the open shredder bin on subjects’ desktops results in a general
avoidance to use shortcuts to avoid seeing the paper waste. In this section,
we provide evidence that the former is the case. In Figure 5.3, the average
number of shortcuts is compared between period t in which the subject uses
the shortcut for the first time and the subsequent period t+ 1.
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Figure 5.3: Number of shortcuts — first vs. second use.
There is no difference in the average number of used shortcuts in the
first period in which subjects actually use a shortcut (two-sided MWU-
test: CLOSED75 vs. OPEN75: p=0.4534, CLOSED40 vs. OPEN40:
p=0.7307).10 Further, there is no significant difference in the number of
subjects who never use a shortcut between CLOSED75 and OPEN75 (two-
sided Fisher’s exact test: p=1.000) as well as between CLOSED40 and
OPEN40 (p=0.415). These findings suggest that the observed treatment
effect cannot be ascribed to a general avoidance of subjects to use the short-
10In this and the following comparisons, we exclude subjects who never use a shortcut,
and also two subjects who first use the shortcut in the final period. The resulting number
of independent observations is 24 subjects in CLOSED75, 25 subjects in OPEN75, 29
subjects in CLOSED40, and 24 subjects in OPEN40.
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cut when the shredder bin is open. However, when we focus our analysis
on subjects’ decision-making after the first use of a shortcut, we find differ-
ences between the two feedback mechanisms in the high opportunity cost
treatments. Recall that the average number of used shortcuts is not differ-
ent between CLOSED75 and OPEN75 as well as between CLOSED40 and
OPEN40 in period t. In period t+ 1, there is also no significant difference
between CLOSED75 and OPEN75 (p=0.4439). However, the average num-
ber of used shortcuts is significantly lower in period t+ 1 of OPEN40 than
in period t + 1 of CLOSED40 (p=0.0373). That is, being confronted with
the shredding process for the first time in OPEN40 has a significant impact
on decision-making.
Table 5.2: Number of used shortcuts.
(1) (2)
Period -0.0161*** -0.0164***
(0.00) (0.00)
OPEN 0.0889 -0.2398
(0=no, 1=yes) (1.13) (1.07)
Time limit 4.5892*** 3.0317***
(0=75sec, 1=40sec) (1.20) (1.03)
OPEN × Time limit -2.5898* 0.2345
(0=75sec, 1=40sec) (1.53) (1.51)
Adaption after 1st use -0.6860***
(0.21)
constant -1.8963** 2.2444***
(0.91) (0.76)
number of observations 7,150 5,100
number of subjects 143 102
Wald Chi-squared 96.05*** 103.46***
Notes: Random-effects panel tobit regression, robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***:
p<0.01. Dependent variable: Number of used shortcuts in
a given period, left-censored to 0.
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To further examine whether the open shredder bin has an impact on
decision-making that goes beyond the initial effect after observing the shred-
ding process in OPEN, we run a panel tobit regression on all independent
observations of the main treatments in our sample. The results are pre-
sented in Table 5.2. We see that there is a significant overall decrease of
used shortcuts over time. In line with Hypothesis 2, time pressure leads to a
significantly higher level of used shortcuts. The interaction between OPEN
and time pressure is only significant in model (1), but the effect vanishes
once we control for adaption after the first use of shortcuts in model (2).
Hence, we conclude that the initial effect of observing the wasted resources
drives our treatment effect of feedback on accumulated resource wasting
under high opportunity costs.
5.5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we experimentally study the impact of different feedback
regimes on resource consumption in a laboratory environment in which we
systematically vary the opportunity costs of resource conservation. We ma-
nipulate individual feedback on accumulated resource wasting to influence
individual resource conservation.
We find that the effect of feedback differs with varying opportunity costs
of resource conservation. When the use of shortcuts imposes a negative ex-
ternality, substantially fewer shortcuts are used in all treatments. Subjects
substitute resource consumption by own effort and – in the high opportunity
cost treatments – even by own payoff. Feedback on accumulated resource
consumption does not have an additional effect in the treatments with low
opportunity costs. However, in the treatments with high opportunity costs,
it reduces resource consumption even further. This effect can be attributed
to a shift in consumption that results from the initial effect of observing
the waste resulting from shortcut use.
Our study shows that feedback mechanisms need to focus on the inter-
play of information provision and economic incentives. Specifically, studies
that intervene in individual resource consumption need to carefully take
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into account the opportunity costs associated with a behavioral change. In
contrast to our laboratory setting in which opportunity costs cannot be
externalized and have to be incurred by the subject (i.e., she has to “pay”
for the conservation of resources by a lower monetary payoff), such an ex-
ternalization may well be the case in the field. Opportunity costs and thus
the efficacy of interventions are highly context-dependent and should thus
be a cornerstone of any intervention design.
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5.A THEORETICAL APPENDIX
The decision problem is given by:
max{et, st}Ut(et, st; τ, φ) = u(et)− c(et, st)− d(st; τ, φ).
We assume that the physical real-effort costs c(et, st) are independent of
the time limit τ and the feedback φ, i.e., solving a slider is equally difficult
under a high and a low time limit, and also under varying feedback. How-
ever, τ and φ influence the real-effort costs indirectly since both variables
influence the perceived environmental costs d(st; τ, φ), and thus affect an
individual’s decision how many shortcuts to use.
The first-order conditions are given by:
F (e, s; τ, φ) = ue − ce = 0
and
G(e, s; τ, φ) = −cs − ds = 0,
where subscripts denote the partial derivative with respect to that vari-
able. We assume that all functions are continuously differentiable. Fur-
ther, we assume that utility from money is increasing and concave in effort
(ue > 0, uee < 0), that effort costs increase and are convex in effort (ce > 0,
cee > 0), and that effort costs are decreasing and convex in used shortcuts
(cs < 0, css > 0). Further, we assume that perceived environmental costs
are increasing and convex in provided feedback (ds > 0, dss > 0). Further,
the marginal perceived environmental costs increase in provided feedback
(dsφ > 0) and in the available time (dsτ > 0). Further, we assume that
ces < 0, cse < 0. Thus, we have the following partial derivatives of the
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first-order conditions:
Fe = uee − cee < 0
Fs = −ces > 0
Fφ = 0
Fτ = 0
Ge = −cse > 0
Gs = −css − dss < 0
Gφ = −dsφ < 0
Gτ = −dsτ < 0.
Totally differentiating the first-order conditions yields:
Fede+ Fsds+ Fτdτ + Fφdφ = 0
Gede+Gsds+Gτdτ +Gφdφ = 0.
Effect of Varying the Time Limit: We divide both total derivatives by
dτ and set dφ
dτ
= 0, because our treatment variables are orthogonal, i.e., the
time limit does not influence the provided feedback. Rearranging yields
Fe
de
dτ
+ Fs
ds
dτ
= −Fτ
Ge
de
dτ
+Gs
ds
dτ
= −Gτ .
By Cramer’s rule, we get:
ds
dτ
=
det
Fe −Fτ
Ge −Gτ

det
Fe Fs
Ge Gs

.
123
We have:
det
Fe −Fτ
Ge −Gτ
 = FτGe − FeGτ
= −FeGτ
= −(uee − cee)(−dsτ )
< 0
and
det
Fe Fs
Ge Gs
 = FeGs − FsGe
= (uee − cee)(−css − dss)− (−ces)(−cse).
For a clear prediction, we need the following assumption with regard to the
concavity of the utility function u(e):
uee < cee − (−ces)
2
(css + dss)
. (5.A.1)
Then, we have:
ds
dτ
< 0,
i.e., the more time is available, the fewer shortcuts the decision-maker uses.
Effect of Varying the Feedback: We divide both total derivatives by
dφ and set dτ
dφ
= 0, because our treatment variables are orthogonal, i.e., the
provided feedback does not influence the time limit. Rearranging yields
Fe
de
dφ
+ Fs
ds
dφ
= −Fφ
Ge
de
dφ
+Gs
ds
dφ
= −Gφ.
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By Cramer’s rule, we get:
ds
dφ
=
det
Fe −Fφ
Ge −Gφ

det
Fe Fs
Ge Gs

.
We have:
det
Fe −Fφ
Ge −Gφ
 = FφGe − FeGφ
= −FeGφ
= −(uee − cee)(−dsφ)
< 0.
Thus, given our assumption in Equation (5.A.1), we get:
ds
dφ
< 0,
i.e., the more feedback is provided, the fewer shortcuts the decision-maker
uses.
Interaction Effect between Time Limit and Feedback: We differen-
tiate ds
dφ
with respect to the time limit τ to analyze how the change through
a variation of feedback provision depends on the time limit. We get
ds
dφdτ
=
d
dτ
[−FeGφ] (FeGs − FsGe)− ddτ [FeGs − FsGe] (−FeGφ)
(FeGs −GeFs)2 .
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Under the given assumptions, the sign of ds
dφdτ
depends on the sign of
d
dτ
[−FeGφ] = − (FeGφτ )
= −(uee − cee)(−dsφτ ),
and
d
dτ
[FeGs − FsGe] = FeGsτ
= (uee − cee)(−dssτ ).
We assume that dssτ < 0 and dsφτ > 0. Then, we have:
ds
dφdτ
< 0,
i.e., the impact of feedback on the use of shortcuts is stronger under a strict
time limit.
126
5.B EXPERIMENTAL APPENDIX
5.B.1 TRANSLATED INSTRUCTIONS AND SCREENSHOTS
In the experiment, the instructions were provided on screen. The instruc-
tions are translated from German. The sample instructions belong to treat-
ment OPEN75 and CLOSED75. All deviations in treatments CLOSED40
and OPEN40 are given in square brackets.
Instructions of the four main treatments
— Screen 1 —
Instructions for the experiment — general information
We welcome you to this economic experiment. It is very important that
you read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, please
get in touch with us. Please lift your hand, we will come to you and help
you personally.
In today’s experiment, it is not allowed to keep personal belongings (books,
lecture notes, etc.) or mobile phones and other electronic devices within
reach or to use them. Thus, please put your bags and personal belongings
behind your seat. Please turn off your mobile phone and ensure that the
alarm is deactivated. Please put your mobile phone and other electronic
devices into the envelope that has been placed in your cabin. Please do not
seal the envelope, this will be done by the lab team. The envelope remains in
your cabin during the entire experiment and must not be opened. During
the experiment, it is not allowed to talk to the other participants of the
experiment. Non-compliance with this rule leads to exclusion from the
experiment and from all payments.
For the duration of the experiment, you are assigned a shredder. For safety
reasons and to ensure the participants’ anonymity, the shredder is located in
the second room of the laboratory. A live video of the shredder is streamed
on your screen in real time for the entire duration of the experiment. Please
verify that you can see a video of the shredder on the right half of your
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screen. Please note: The webcam of your desktop is deactivated. We would
like to ask you to mark your shredder such that at any time you can verify
that it is your shredder you see. For this purpose, please use the Post-It
note that has been place in your cabin. The form of your marking is up
to you. The lab team will collect your Post-It note before the experiment
begins and will mark your assigned shredder.
You can earn money in this experiment. For showing up for this experiment,
you receive 4.00 Euro. During the experiment, you can earn additional
money. The amount you earn at the end of the experiment depends only
on your own decisions and is not influenced by the decisions of the other
participants.
All decisions are made anonymously, i.e., none of the other participants
gets to know the identity of a participant who made a certain decision. All
payments are made anonymously, too, i.e., no participant gets to know the
payoff of the other participants.
After the experiment, we would like to ask you to fill in a questionnaire
while we prepare your payment. After you have filled in the questionnaire,
please stay at your cabin until we separately call your cabin numbers for
payment.
Good luck and thank your for your participation!
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— Screen 2 —
Practice period 1
On the following screen, you will see 10 sliders. Each slider can be moved to
any possible position between 0 and 100. The start position of each slider
is determined randomly. For each slider which you position exactly on
position 50 before the time expires, you earn 4 Cents. You have 75 seconds
[CLOSED40/OPEN40: 40 seconds] to position the 10 sliders. Your round
income is calculated as follows:
Round income = Number of correctly positioned sliders × 4 Cent
— Screen 3 —
Figure 5.B.1: Screenshot difficult practice period.
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— Screen 4 —
Practice period 2
On the following screen, you will see 10 sliders. Each slider can be moved
to three possible positions (0, 50, 100). The start position of each slider is
0. For each slider which you position exactly on position 50 before the time
expires, you earn 4 Cents. You have 75 seconds [CLOSED40/OPEN40:
40 seconds] to position the 10 sliders. Your round income is calculated as
follows:
Round income = Number of correctly positioned sliders × 4 Cent
— Screen 5 —
Figure 5.B.2: Screenshot difficult practice period.
130
— Screen 6 —
Main part of the experiment
The main part of the experiment consists of 50 rounds with 10 sliders each.
As in practice period 1, each slider can be moved to any possible position
between 0 and 100. The start position of each slider is determined randomly
and is an integer value between 0 and 100. For each slider which you position
exactly on position 50 before the time expires, you earn 4 Cents. You have
75 seconds [CLOSED40/OPEN40: 40 seconds] in each round to position
the 10 sliders. Your round income in each of the 50 rounds is calculated as
follows:
Round income = Number of correctly positioned sliders × 4 Cent
Simplification
Before the start of each round, you are given the opportunity to indicate
how many of the 10 sliders you want to simplify in this round. As in practice
period 2, each simplified slider has three possible positions (0, 50, 100) to
which the slider can be moved. The start position of each simplified slider
is 0. Please note: Of the 10 sliders of one round the simplified ones are
displayed first (ordered from the top).
For each slider you simplify, after the time for positioning the sliders expires,
a blank sheet of paper will be shredded in the other room by the shredder
which you marked. In each round, it applies that:
Number of simplified sliders = number of shredded sheets of paper
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— Screen 7 —
Figure 5.B.3: Shortcut decision screen.
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5.B.2 PICTURES
Figure 5.B.4: Closed shredder bin.
Figure 5.B.5: Open shredder bin.
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Figure 5.B.6: Experimental setup.
Figure 5.B.7: Shredder marking.
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5.C EMPIRICAL APPENDIX
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50
NOEXT75 CLOSED75 OPEN75
NOEXT40 CLOSED40 OPEN40
used shortcuts solved sliders
u
se
d 
sh
or
tc
ut
s/
so
lve
d 
sli
de
rs
period
Figure 5.C.1: Used shortcuts and solved sliders by period.
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